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I. INTRODUCTION
District of Columbia v. Heller1 is arguably the most important decision 
of the 2007–2008 Supreme Court term.  Pertaining to gun control, the case 
was met with a deluge of articles ranging from issues of judicial 
minimalism, to constitutional originalism, to the rules versus standards 
debate.2  One important point was overlooked by commentators, however: 
the fact that Justice Breyer, in his dissenting opinion, came close to 
introducing the significant European doctrine of proportionality into 
American constitutional jurisprudence.  Indeed, arguing against the use 
of a categorical strict scrutiny test in the application of the Second 
Amendment, Breyer stated: 
[A]ny attempt in theory to apply strict scrutiny to gun regulations will in
practice turn into an interest-balancing inquiry, with the interests protected by 
the Second Amendment on one side and the governmental public-safety 
concerns on the other . . . . 
 1. 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008). 
2. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Heller, HLR, and Holistic Legal Reasoning, 122 
HARV. L. REV. 145 (2008); Glenn H. Reynolds & Brannon P. Denning, Heller’s Future 
in the Lower Courts, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 2035 (2008); Richard Schragger, The Last 
Progressive: Justice Breyer, Heller, and “Judicial Judgment,” 59 SYRACUSE L. REV. 283 
(2008); Reva B. Siegel, Dead or Alive: Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism in 
Heller, 122 HARV. L. REV. 191 (2008); Cass R. Sunstein, Second Amendment 
Minimalism: Heller as Griswold, 122 HARV. L. REV. 246 (2008); J. Harvie Wilkinson III,
Of Guns, Abortions, and the Unraveling Rule of Law, 95 VA. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1265118; Mark 
Tushnet, Two Essays on District of Columbia v. Heller (Harvard Pub. Law Working 
Paper, Paper No. 08-17, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. 
cfm?abstract_id=1189494; Glenn Harlan Reynolds & Brannon P. Denning, The Year of 
the Gun: Second Amendment Rights and the Supreme Court, 86 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO
22 (2008), http://www.texaslrev.com/seealso/pdfs/yeargun.pdf. 
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 . . . Contrary to the majority’s unsupported suggestion that this sort of 
“proportionality” approach is unprecedented, the Court has applied it in various 
constitutional contexts, including election-law cases, speech cases, and due 
process cases.3
 The tremendous influence and importance of the doctrine of proportionality 
in European constitutional law, as well as many other constitutional 
systems, cannot be overstated.  Proportionality, which essentially requires 
that rights infringement be proportional to governmental ends, is arguably 
the most dominant doctrine in constitutional adjudication worldwide.4
Since the 1970s, it has expanded to almost every democracy across the 
globe.5  Currently, proportionality is one of the defining features of what 
can be termed global constitutionalism. 
The use of the term “proportionality” by a Justice as well-versed in 
European constitutional law as Breyer cannot be seen as pure coincidence.6
3. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2852 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
4. See, e.g., DAVID M. BEATTY, THE ULTIMATE RULE OF LAW 159, 171–76 (2004); 
Aharon Barak, Proportional Effect: The Israeli Experience, 57 U. TORONTO L.J. 369,
370–73 (2007); Dieter Grimm, Proportionality in Canadian and German Constitutional 
Jurisprudence, 57 U. TORONTO L.J. 383, 384–85 (2007); Vicki C. Jackson, Being
Proportional About Proportionality, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 803 (2004) (presenting a 
critique of Beatty’s approach); Francis G. Jacobs, Recent Developments in the Principle 
of Proportionality in European Community Law, in THE PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY 
IN THE LAWS OF EUROPE 1, 1 (Evelyn Ellis ed., 1999); Jeffery Jowell & Anthony Lester, 
Proportionality: Neither Novel nor Dangerous, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN JUDICIAL REVIEW
51, 53–55 (J.L. Jowell & D. Oliver eds., 1988); Mattias Kumm, Political Liberalism and 
the Structure of Rights: On the Place and Limits of the Proportionality Requirement, in 
LAW, RIGHTS AND DISCOURSE: THE LEGAL PHILOSOPHY OF ROBERT ALEXY 131, 139–41 
(G. Pavlakos ed., 2007); David S. Law, Generic Constitutional Law, 89 MINN. L. REV.
652, 693–95 (2005); Alec Stone Sweet & Jud Mathews, Proportionality Balancing and 
Global Constitutionalism, 47 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 72, 73–74 (2008).
 5. For a detailed description of the rapid spread of proportionality analysis around 
the globe, see Stone Sweet & Mathews, supra note 4, at 74–75, 111–59. 
 6. Justice Breyer specifically referred to the proportionality approach in his book, 
Active Liberty.  STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC 
CONSTITUTION 48–49 (2005).  Justice Breyer also participated in a 2001 Yale Law 
School seminar titled, “Global Constitutionalism: Privacy, Proportionality, The Political 
Case” (copies of the materials that were distributed among the participants are compiled 
with the authors).  In addition, Justice Breyer has participated in several Salzburg global 
law seminars.  Salzburg Global Seminar, The Honorable Justice Breyer, http://www. 
salzburgseminar.org/2009/includes/FacultyPopUp.cfm?IDSPECIAL_EVENT=264&ID
Records=637 (last visited May 31, 2009).  The Salzburg Global Seminar is an American 
nongovernmental organization that conducts seminars on law, economics, and politics, 
and it has proven to be an important forum for dialogue and exchange of ideas amongst 
leading American and non-American legal scholars and jurists.  Accordingly, there 
appears to be a general view of judicial globalization.  See ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A
NEW WORLD ORDER 70 (2004); Jenny S. Martinez, Towards an International Judicial 
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Justice Breyer has used the word proportionality before, but always in 
the same sense that it bears in common spoken language—proportionate 
versus disproportionate, or the proportionality of a restriction.7 Heller
appears to be the first case in which Breyer explicitly used proportionality 
as a term of art, by using the phrase “proportionality approach.”8
Arguably, at least two messages are implicit in Breyer’s deliberate use of 
this term: (1) that the doctrine of proportionality is analogous to the 
American concept of balancing interests; and (2) that proportionality is 
part of American constitutional law.  Given the centrality of proportionality 
analysis in so many other legal systems, the ramifications of these messages 
are great.  The inherent implication is that American constitutional law is 
not as different from European constitutional law as some commentators 
and Justices would suggest.9  Breyer’s dissent in Heller thus marks an 
important stage in the Court’s ongoing debate over the relationship of 
U.S. constitutional law with foreign constitutional law. 
This last step in the foreign law debate is interesting and important in 
at least two respects.  First, the allusion to foreign constitutional law in 
Heller is implicit rather than explicit.  Despite his reference to proportionality, 
not a sole foreign legal authority was cited by Justice Breyer.  Rather, he 
based his entire argument for proportionality on decisions from 
American case law that, in his view, manifest the doctrine.10  This could 
represent a shift in strategy regarding the use of foreign law.  Instead of 
System, 56 STAN. L. REV. 429, 436–37 (2003) (arguing that the extensive reference to 
foreign law is tied to a common judicial culture that cuts across borders and 
jurisdictions); Anne-Marie Slaughter, Judicial Globalization, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 1103, 
1104, 1116, 1120 (2000). 
7. See, e.g., Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 388 (2002) (Breyer, 
J., dissenting) (“[The Court] has examined the restrictions’ proportionality, the relation 
between restriction and objective, the fit between ends and means.”); Bartnicki v. 
Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 540 (2001) (“[T]he statutes’ enforcement would disproportionately 
harm media freedom.”); Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 402 (2000) 
(“Rather, [the Court] has balanced interests.  And in practice that has meant asking 
whether the statute burdens any one such interest in a manner out of proportion to the 
statute’s salutary effects upon the others.”); United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 
529 U.S. 803, 846 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Consequently § 505’s restriction, 
viewed in light of the proposed alternative, is proportionate to need.  That is to say, it 
restricts speech no more than necessary to further that compelling need.”). 
8. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2852 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
9. See infra note 21. 
10. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2852 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  Breyer cites the following 
decisions, the first of which was written by him: Thompson, 535 U.S. at 388 (Breyer, J., 
dissenting) (commercial speech); Nixon, 528 U.S. at 403 (Breyer, J., concurring); 
Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433 (1992) (election regulation); Mathews v. 
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 339–49 (1976) (due process); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 
U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (government employee speech).  Only Breyer’s own opinions use 
the term “proportional.”  The earlier cases he cites all use the term “balancing” rather 
than “proportionality.” 
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introducing foreign law doctrines directly, an attempt is made to find 
them within American constitutional law.  This tactic gives foreign law 
doctrines American credentials and prevents any criticism over the 
infiltration of foreign materials into American law.11  The second respect 
in which the Heller dissent is important relates to the use of foreign 
methodology, as opposed to foreign substantive ideas.  Proportionality, 
after all, is a methodology, or a doctrine; it does not entail a substantive 
commitment, such as that inherently required by opposition to capital 
punishment,12 or sodomy laws,13 or espousing more expansive notions of 
equality.14  The implementation of a foreign methodology marks yet 
another strategic shift because it can, while appearing neutral, facilitate 
the subsequent entry of foreign substantive ideas by creating a common 
framework and language in which constitutional dialogue can occur. 
These unique features aside, the validity of this reference to the 
proportionality approach can still be questioned.  In other words, it is 
unclear whether Justice Breyer was correct in maintaining that a 
proportionality approach is well established in American constitutional 
law, or whether Justice Scalia was correct in asserting that Justice 
Breyer’s approach is unprecedented.15
This Article first describes the unique attributes of the use of foreign 
law in the Heller dissent, and then addresses the soundness of the 
specific claim that the United States and Europe share the common 
methodology of proportionality.  This Article argues that Justice Breyer 
 11. The strongest criticism against the introduction of foreign law into American 
constitutional law is voiced by originalists, who argue that such a move is at odds with 
the understanding of the Constitution as a self-contained document that forms the 
constituting contract among the individuals who compose the American polity.  Thus, 
any resort to foreign law cannot be viewed as authoritative.  Roger P. Alford, Four
Mistakes in the Debate on “Outsourcing Authority,” 69 ALB. L. REV. 653, 658–60 
(2006); Law, supra note 4, at 727–42 (pointing to the democratic deficiency in the 
Supreme Court’s use of foreign law).  For a more detailed account of the criticism of 
reference to foreign law in American constitutional law cases, see infra notes 16–19 and 
accompanying text. 
12. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575 (2005) (striking down laws 
imposing capital punishment for crimes committed by minors); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 
U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2002) (striking down laws imposing capital punishment for crimes 
committed by the mentally disabled). 
 13. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577–79 (2003) (striking down the Texas 
sodomy law that criminalized sodomy between consenting adults). 
 14. Gutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 344 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (citing 
to an international treaty to support the Court’s longstanding determination that race-
conscious programs “must have a logical end point”). 
15. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2821. 
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was correct in his contention that a doctrinal framework very similar to 
proportionality is embedded in American constitutional law in the guise 
of balancing.  However, this Article argues that Breyer missed an 
important divergence between the two doctrines: the significantly 
different ways in which balancing and proportionality are situated in 
America and Europe, respectively, owing to their very different historical, 
cultural, and institutional characteristics.  Taking a contextual approach 
that emphasizes cultural and institutional factors, this Article claims that 
the two doctrines are, in fact, quite distinct.  Thus, insofar as his claims 
are descriptive, simply indicating similarities between American and 
European constitutional law, Breyer’s claims are only partially valid 
because they disregard context.  However, Breyer might have been 
engaging in a more normative project: by tossing the term proportionality 
into the American constitutional lexicon, he might have been seeking to 
create a framework for bringing the operation and thinking of American 
constitutional law closer to European constitutional law.  This Article 
therefore explores some indications that the introduction of proportionality 
into the constitutional law of other countries, such as Canada, may have 
contributed to their development of a more European frame of mind and 
has certainly facilitated more extensive dialogue with Europe. 
Part I begins with a review of the Heller decision, demonstrating how 
Justice Breyer’s comments were a covert move in the foreign law 
debate.  Part II discusses the validity of Breyer’s claim of a similarity in 
the doctrinal structures of American balancing and European proportionality.  
Part II illustrates how different conceptions of constitutional culture and 
of the state’s role in the polity produce different approaches towards the 
concepts of balancing in the United States and proportionality in Europe, 
thereby distinguishing them significantly despite their doctrinal resemblance.  
Taking the example of Germany, the birthplace of proportionality and 
arguably the most influential European country in terms of constitutional 
law, Part II explains that the country’s organic and cooperative 
conception of the polity has made proportionality and balancing a central 
and intrinsically important feature of its constitutional framework.  This 
German model of balancing is termed “intrinsic balancing.”  In the 
United States, greater public suspicion of the Court and of the 
government has led to a more minor and subsidiary role for balancing, 
causing it to have instrumental rather than intrinsic value.  This type of 
balancing is termed “bounded balancing.”  Part III focuses on structural 
differences—the way in which rights are defined in constitutional texts—
to further illustrate the different uses of the concepts of balancing and 
proportionality in their respective legal systems.  Finally, the Afterword 
closes with some thoughts on constitutional borrowing, using the example 
of Canada. 
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II. HELLER AND THE FOREIGN LAW DEBATE
The debate over the appeal to foreign law in American constitutional 
interpretation has been raging in the Court for some time now.  
Proponents claim its invaluable contribution in adding the vital perspectives 
and experience of other countries.16  They also hint at the inherent
benefits of making U.S. jurisprudence more in tune with the global 
constitutional community.17  Opponents, however, stress the dangers of 
indeterminacy that arise with the use of foreign law and argue that 
foreign materials are irrelevant to internal constitutional interpretation.18
The latter camp is often associated with a strong democratic conception 
of the Constitution, viewing it as embodying the particular and distinct 
commitments of the American people.19  Foreign law proponents, in 
 16. See Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Global Community of Courts, 44 HARV. INT’L
L.J. 191 (2003), stating that: 
[L]ooking abroad simply helps [Supreme Court Justices] do a better job at 
home, in the sense that they can approach a particular problem more creatively 
or with greater insight.  Foreign authority is persuasive because it teaches them 
something they did not know or helps them see an issue in a different and more 
tractable light. 
Id. at 201.
 17. Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Comparisons: Convergence, Resistance, 
Engagement, 119 HARV. L. REV. 109, 111 (2005) (“[C]onsidering foreign and international 
law within a framework of learning by engagement—assuming neither convergence nor 
disagreement—is a legitimate interpretive tool that offers modest benefits (and fewer 
risks than current debate suggests) to the processes of constitutional adjudication.”); see 
also Sujit Choudhry, Globalization in Search of Justification: Toward a Theory of 
Comparative Constitutional Interpretation, 74 IND. L.J. 819, 835 (1999) (advocating 
engagement in comparativism through “dialogical” interpretation). 
 18. Charles Fried, Scholars and Judges: Reason and Power, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 807, 819 (2000) (arguing against Justice Breyer’s introduction of foreign law in 
Printz, saying that “[t]he dispute is particularly striking because it would be one of the 
few instances of a deliberate attempt by a Justice to expand the canon of authoritative 
materials from which constitutional common law reasoning might go forward”); Richard 
Posner, No Thanks, We Already Have Our Own Laws, LEGAL AFF., July–Aug. 2004, at 
40, 41 (pointing to the “problem with according even limited precedential weight to 
foreign or international decisions [which lies in] the promiscuous opportunities that are 
opened up”). 
 19. Kenneth Anderson, Squaring the Circle? Reconciling Sovereignty and Global 
Governance Through Global Government Networks, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1255, 1307 
(2005) (reviewing SLAUGHTER, supra note 6, and arguing that “[c]onstitutions are unique 
insofar as they are the constitutive document of a political community.  As such, the 
issue is not so much the content of doctrine but instead its governance—the fact that it 
comes out of the constitutional and constitutive processes of a particular community”); 
Jed Rubenfeld, Commentary, Unilateralism and Constitutionalism, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1971, 1999 (2004) (“[I]t is critical for constitutional law to be made and interpreted not 
by international experts, but by national political actors and judges.”); Robert H. Bork, 
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contrast, tend to espouse a more universalistic approach, one that conceives 
rights jurisprudence as involving similar problems wherever it develops.20
The foreign law debate is interrelated with the debate regarding the 
extent of American constitutional law’s divergence from other constitutional 
legal systems, known as the question of American exceptionalism.21
The more exceptional American constitutional law is, the harder it is to 
compare it to other constitutional legal systems or to borrow from them.  
American exceptionalism can be divided into substantive exceptionalism 
and methodological exceptionalism.22  In terms of substantive exceptionalism, 
commentators have addressed the unique priority given to free speech in 
American constitutional law, as well as the strong separation of state and 
religion and the particular U.S. commitment to what has been termed 
“the twin instruments of death”: guns and capital punishment.23  From 
the perspective of methodology under the exceptionalist view, American 
constitutional law tends to be categorical rather than openended and 
standard-like; the constitutional analysis is conducted in its entirety in a 
single stage of identifying whether a constitutional right has been infringed 
or which category applies to the given case.24  European constitutional 
Travesty Time, Again: In Its Death-Penalty Decision, the Supreme Court Hits a New 
Low, NAT’L REV., Mar. 28, 2005, at 17, 18 (criticizing the Court’s reference to foreign 
law, which “in tacit coordination with foreign courts, is moving toward a global bill of 
rights”).
 20. Jeremy Waldron, Foreign Law and the Modern Ius Gentium, 119 HARV. L.
REV. 129, 138–40, 143 (2005) (advocating a cosmopolitical position that supports 
reliance on foreign law). 
 21. The term “American exceptionalism” can be traced back to ALEXIS DE 
TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 455–56 (J.P. Mayer ed., George Lawrence 
trans., Doubleday 1969) (1835).  The literature on American exceptionalism is vast.  See,
e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, “A Shining City on a Hill”: American Exceptionalism and the 
Supreme Court’s Practice of Relying on Foreign Law, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1335 (2006); 
Michael Ignatieff, Introduction: American Exceptionalism and Human Rights, in
AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS 1 (Michael Ignatieff ed., 2005); Harold 
Hongju Koh, On American Exceptionalism, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1479, 1483 (2003); 
Frederick Schauer, Freedom of Expression Adjudication in Europe and the United 
States: A Case Study in Comparative Constitutional Architecture, in EUROPEAN AND US
CONSTITUTIONALISM 49, 49–51 (Georg Nolte ed., 2005). 
22. See sources cited infra note 65. 
 23. Stephen Gardbaum, The Myth and the Reality of American Constitutional 
Exceptionalism, 107 MICH. L. REV. 391, 395–96 (2008).  An accessible review of major 
aspects of American substantive exceptionalism was provided in a series of articles 
published recently in The New York Times.  The New York Times, American Exception, 
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/us/series/american_exception/index.html (last visited 
May 31, 2009).  The series, written by Adam Liptak between October 17, 2007, and 
September 18, 2008, is entitled American Exception and sets out to “examine 
commonplace aspects of the American justice system that are virtually unique in the 
world.” Id.
 24. Schauer, supra note 21, at 68; Frederick Schauer, The Convergence of Rules 
and Standards, 2003 N.Z. L. REV. 303, 308–09 (2003); Frederick Schauer, The 
Exceptional First Amendment, in AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS,
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law, in contrast, is depicted as more standard-like and as a two-stage 
analysis.  The first stage is the identification of an infringement, while in 
the second stage, the government tries to justify the infringement by 
showing that it was pursuing a legitimate governmental end using 
proportional governmental means.25  Opponents of the exceptionalist 
view argue that differences between the United States and other legal 
systems are overestimated and that American exceptionalism is, to a 
large extent, a myth: Focusing their criticism on the methodological 
prong of the exceptionalist approach,26 opponents stress that U.S. 
constitutionalism is facing the same generic problems and using roughly 
the same set of doctrines as the rest of the legal world.27
In the Supreme Court, two of the major participants in both of these 
debates have been Justice Breyer, who argues for the use of foreign law 
and, implicitly, against the exceptionalist view, and Justice Scalia, who 
criticizes a resort to foreign law and advocates exceptionalism.28  The 
supra note 21, at 29, 32 [hereinafter Schauer, The Exceptional First Amendment].  In 
addition, see also Mattias Kumm & Víctor Ferreres Comella, What Is So Special About 
Constitutional Rights in Private Litigation? A Comparative Analysis of the Function of 
State Action Requirements and Indirect Horizontal Effect, in THE CONSTITUTION IN 
PRIVATE RELATIONS: EXPANDING CONSTITUTIONALISM 241, 278, 286 (Andras Sajo & 
Renata Uitz eds., 2005).  Kumm and Comella state: 
It would be false to claim that proportionality analysis and balancing have no 
role to play in American constitutional law.  They obviously do.  Yet it is also 
clear that, unlike the courts used as a point of comparison here, the Supreme 
Court is more hesitant in its embrace of proportionality analysis and frames 
inquiries in a way that appears more legalistic and categorical. 
Id. at 278 (footnote omitted). 
 25. Lorraine E. Weinrib, The Postwar Paradigm and American Exceptionalism, in
THE MIGRATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL IDEAS 84, 92–98 (Sujit Choudhry ed., 2006). 
 26. Gardbaum, supra note 23, at 425 (“[W]hile I think Fred Schauer is correct that 
U.S. free speech jurisprudence is more categorical in this sense, reflecting in part as he 
argues an exceptionally strong substantive commitment to free speech protection, it 
should not be automatically inferred that this approach applies to other constitutional 
rights.”) (footnote omitted). 
27. See, e.g., BEATTY, supra note 4, at 2–5; Stephen Gardbaum, Limiting 
Constitutional Rights, 54 UCLA L. REV. 789, 853 (2007); Gardbaum, supra note 23, at 
411–16; Law, supra note 4, at 659–60. 
 28. Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Ginsburg have sided with Breyer in the 
debate.  For O’Connor’s position, see Sandra Day O’Connor, Commentary, Broadening 
Our Horizons: Why American Lawyers Must Learn About Foreign Law, FED. LAW.,
Sept. 1998, at 20, 20–21.  See also O’Connor’s dissenting opinion in Roper v. Simmons,
stating that “this Nation’s evolving understanding of human dignity certainly is neither 
wholly isolated from, nor inherently at odds with, the values prevailing in other 
countries.”  543 U.S. 551, 605 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).  Additionally, see 
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, “A Decent Respect to the Opinions of [Human]kind”: The 
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foreign law debate seems to have begun in the Printz decision in 1997: 
Justice Breyer’s reference to comparative constitutional law to determine 
whether a federal statute violated American federalism aroused fierce 
criticism from Justice Scalia.29  Between 2002 and 2005, the foreign law 
debate intensified as the Court addressed such major issues as capital 
punishment for the mentally disabled,30 the constitutionality of sodomy 
laws,31 affirmative action in college admission,32 and the applicability of 
the death penalty to juvenile offenders.33
Somewhat surprisingly, there has been no major decision referring to 
foreign law since Roper was decided in 2005.  The Heller case presented 
what seemed like the ideal context in which the debate would reappear: 
like Lawrence and Roper before it, Heller also involved an issue for 
which the American constitutional approach diverged dramatically from 
that taken by other systems.  The precedence given to the right to bear 
Value of a Comparative Perspective in Constitutional Adjudication, 99 AM. SOC’Y INT’L
L. PROC. 351, 355 (2005) (“The notion that it is improper to look beyond the borders of 
the United States in grappling with hard questions has a certain kinship to the view that 
the U.S. Constitution is a document essentially frozen in time as of the date of its 
ratification.”).  In addition, see the characterization of Justice Kennedy’s opinion in 
Roper.  Jackson, supra note 17, at 115 (referring to Roper, 543 U.S. at 575, and stating
that for Justice Kennedy, “foreign law, practice, and reasoning—though not 
‘controlling’—helped to confirm the Court’s judgment based on the weight of state 
practices and its view of the moral capacities of adolescents”).  Justice Breyer endorsed 
references to foreign law in The Relevance of Foreign Legal Materials in U.S. 
Constitutional Cases: A Conversation Between Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice 
Stephen Breyer, 3 INT’L J. CONST. L. 519, 523–24, 537 (2005).  Moreover, see Chief 
Justice Rehnquist’s position in William H. Rehnquist, Foreword to DEFINING THE FIELD 
OF COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, at vii, viii (Vicki C. Jackson & Mark Tushnet 
eds., 2002), stating that “it’s time the U.S. courts began looking to the decisions of other 
constitutional courts to aid in their own deliberative process.”  Id. at viii.  Justice Scalia 
is the most vocal opponent of the introduction of foreign law into American 
constitutional law.  In Roper, he stated that “the basic premise of the Court’s argument—
that American law should conform to the laws of the rest of the world—ought to be 
rejected out of hand.”  Roper, 543 U.S. at 624 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Atkins v. 
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 347–48 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  In addition, Justice 
Thomas, who joined Scalia’s dissenting opinion in Roper, and Chief Justice Roberts, 
who indicated his opposition to the Court’s reference to foreign law in his confirmation 
hearings, both sided with Justice Scalia on this point.  See Roper, 543 U.S. at 607; 
Transcript: Second Day of Hearings on the Nomination of Judge Roberts, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 13, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/13/politics/politicsspecial1/13text-roberts. 
html?_r=1&pagewanted=all (presenting Chief Justice Roberts’s testimony at his 
confirmation hearings, in which he stated that “looking at foreign law for support is like 
looking out over a crowd and picking out your friends”). 
 29. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 921 n.11 (1997) (presenting Justice 
Scalia’s criticism that “comparative analysis [is] inappropriate to the task of interpreting 
a constitution”). 
30. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 320–21. 
 31. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578–79 (2003). 
 32. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343–44 (2003). 
33. Roper, 543 U.S. at 568.
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arms in the Constitution and American culture is unique.34  The special 
status given to this right fits nicely with the conservatism that characterizes 
many of those arguing for American exceptionalism.  It could, therefore, 
be expected that Justice Breyer would support gun control and, moreover, 
would turn to foreign law to support this view by showing a consensus 
among other nations on the constitutionality of gun control.  Similarly, 
Justice Scalia could be expected to fiercely object to gun control and to 
reject any reference to foreign law.  However, no reference to foreign law 
was made, and thus, no debate over the validity of its use ensued.  
Indeed, at first glance, Heller seems to be an entirely internal American 
law debate. 
A.  The Heller Decision
In Heller, the Supreme Court struck down a District of Columbia law 
that drastically limited the ability of its residents to possess handguns.35
The majority opinion, which regarded the right to bear arms as an 
individual and not a collective right, concluded that the law was 
unconstitutional.36  The majority opinion revolved almost entirely 
around the matter of the original meaning of the Second Amendment at 
the time of its ratification, arguing that it had included an understanding 
of the right to bear arms as an individual right.37  Justice Stevens’s 
dissenting opinion also focused on original meaning but argued for the 
opposite understanding.38
In contrast, Justice Breyer’s dissent focused on the test that would be 
applied for the application of the right, regardless of whether it should be 
understood as an individual or collective right.39  This test, he maintained, 
would necessarily entail the balancing of the right against the governmental 
interests underlying the given statute.40  This analysis, according to Breyer, 
would weigh four questions: 
34. See, e.g., Gardbaum, supra note 23, at 407 (“[T]he United States is distinguished 
from other Western countries, where gun ownership is comparatively rare and tends not 
to be a subject that triggers—excuse the pun—the emotions.”). 
 35. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2788 (2008). 
36. Id. at 2797, 2821–22. 
37. Id. at 2788–812. 
38. Id. at 2822–47 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
39. Id. at 2847 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
40. Id.
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[H]ow the statute seeks to further the governmental interests that it serves, how 
the statute burdens the interests that the Second Amendment seeks to protect, 
and whether there are practical less burdensome ways of furthering those 
interests.  The ultimate question is whether the statute imposes burdens that, when 
viewed in light of the statute’s legitimate objectives, are disproportionate.41
In response to Justice Breyer’s position, Justice Scalia’s majority 
opinion rejected such a balancing test for watering down constitutional 
rights.  He stated, “The very enumeration of the right takes out of the hands 
of government—even the Third Branch of Government—the power to 
decide on a case-by-case basis whether the right is really worth insisting
upon.”42  Furthermore, Scalia accused judges who use balancing of 
illegitimately supplementing the words of the Constitution with their 
views on the proper balance between rights and interests.  Breyer’s 
balancing, according to Scalia, was no more than “a judge-empowering 
‘interest-balancing inquiry.’”43
Justice Breyer responded to Scalia’s accusations by asserting that “the 
very nature of the [balancing] approach—requiring careful identification 
of the relevant interests and evaluating the law’s effect upon them—
limits the judge’s choices.”44  Moreover, Breyer argued that his balancing 
method’s “necessary transparency lays bare the judge’s reasoning for all 
to see and to criticize.”45  Finally, Breyer stated that “[c]ontrary to the 
majority’s unsupported suggestion that this sort of ‘proportionality’ 
approach is unprecedented, the Court has applied it in various 
constitutional contexts.”46
B. Foreign Law in Heller: The Proportionality Approach 
From the above exchange between Justices Breyer and Scalia, the 
debate appears to revolve solely around an internal matter of American 
law, seemingly echoing the age-old, uniquely American controversy 
over standards versus rules and balancing versus categorization.47
41. Id. at 2854.
42. Id. at 2821 (majority opinion). 
43. Id.
44. Id. at 2868 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
45. Id.
46. Id. at 2852 (citation omitted). 
 47. The debate between balancing and categorization has been especially strong in 
free speech jurisprudence.  The first round of this debate took place in the early 1960s.  
See Laurent B. Frantz, The First Amendment in the Balance, 71 YALE L.J. 1424, 1449 
(1962) (arguing against balancing in First Amendment jurisprudence); Wallace Mendelson, 
The First Amendment and the Judicial Process: A Reply to Mr. Frantz, 17 VAND. L. REV.
479, 481 (1964) (endorsing balancing in First Amendment jurisprudence).  The debate is 
still very much alive today.  Although in the 1970s and early 1980s it disappeared 
somewhat, the debate has come to life again in recent years.  See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, 
Pragmatism Versus Purposivism in First Amendment Analysis, 54 STAN. L. REV. 737, 
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However, the reference to proportionality in Breyer’s dissent should 
immediately catch the attention of anyone versed in European and global 
constitutional law.  This marked the first time that proportionality was 
used as a term of art in Supreme Court case law.  Other usages of the 
term have been in the context of punishment, in which it bears an 
entirely different meaning, or in the ordinary spoken sense in referring 
to something as “disproportionate” or “proportionate.”48  But, unlike the 
latter usages of the word or its derivatives in case law, Justice Breyer set 
the word in inverted commas and described it as an approach, thereby 
making it clear that the word was being used as a term of art.49
Moreover, interestingly enough, Breyer attributed the original mention 
of proportionality to the majority opinion, in which it actually does not 
appear, when he referred to “the majority’s unsupported suggestion that 
this sort of ‘proportionality’ approach is unprecedented.”50  Breyer cited 
specific pages in the majority opinion, but the closest that any of the 
passages on those pages comes to what Breyer referred to is Justice 
Scalia’s statement, “We know of no other enumerated constitutional right 
whose core protection has been subjected to a freestanding ‘interest-
balancing’ approach.”51  In rephrasing this passage, Breyer exchanged the 
738 (2002) (endorsing balancing in First Amendment analysis); Jed Rubenfeld, The First 
Amendment’s Purpose, 53 STAN. L. REV. 767, 770 (2001) (arguing against balancing in 
the context of the First Amendment).  The debate also extended to constitutional law 
generally.  See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 
YALE L.J. 943 (1987); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Post-Liberal Judging: The Roles of 
Categorization and Balancing, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 293 (1992); Kathleen M. Sullivan, 
The Supreme Court, 1991 Term—Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 
HARV. L. REV. 22, 59 (1992) (describing the debate on the Court as between 
probalancing Justices and procategorization Justices).  For a recent account of the rules 
versus standards debate, see Frederick Schauer, supra note 24, at 305. The debate traces 
back to Justice Holmes’s pro-“standards” position in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, see O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 458 
(1897), versus Hart’s pro-“rules” position, see H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 80
(2d ed. 1994). 
 48. As noted by Gardbaum, supra note 23, at 427 n.171, reference to 
proportionality exists in America in the dormant commerce clause “balancing test” and 
in Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment—“is Congress’s measure so disproportionate 
to any state violations as to go beyond remedy or prevention into ‘substantive’ 
regulation?”  Id.  In the context of rights, the Supreme Court has expressly rejected 
proportionality as part of the test for “cruel and unusual punishment” under the Eighth 
Amendment.  Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 965 (1991). 
49. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2852 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
50. Id.
51. Id. at 2821 (majority opinion). 
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phrase “interest-balancing” for “proportionality.”52  Putting proportionality in 
quotation marks, labeling it an approach, and replacing the majority’s 
words are clear indicators of Breyer’s conscious and intentional decision 
to incorporate the proportionality approach—the well-known European 
doctrine of proportionality—into his dissenting opinion. 
Arguably, Justice Breyer was aware that most people would not notice 
his reference to European proportionality.  Indeed, Justice Scalia apparently 
missed it, for he would have otherwise most likely responded to this, as 
he did to almost every other part of the Breyer dissent.  In fact, it appears 
that this reference has escaped the attention of most of the commentators 
on Heller to date as well.  But, even if Breyer’s invocation of proportionality 
initially went unnoticed, at a later stage, Breyer or any other Justice could 
refer back to the passage as support for the stance that the so-called 
proportionality approach is not without precedent in Supreme Court 
jurisprudence.  Breyer thus furthered the attempt to lay the groundwork 
for the Court’s adoption, or at least recognition, of the doctrine of 
proportionality. 
Proportionality analysis usually proceeds in three stages after a 
legitimate governmental end has been shown to underlie the act 
infringing the given constitutional right.  First, the means applied must 
further this end; second, the government must show that it chose the 
least restrictive means to further that end; and third, the benefits of 
achieving the sought after objective must be proportionate—in a strict 
sense—to the extent of violation of the given right.  This proportionality 
model has been embraced by judges in almost every Western jurisdiction 
outside of the United States, becoming one of the clearest features of 
global constitutionalism.53  The model’s appeal is most likely attributable to 
its clear and systematic analytical formation, its combined flexibility and 
structure, and its seeming ability to capture the generic features of rights 
jurisprudence—including both means-ends analysis and balancing.  
Starting in the 1970s, proportionality began to spread through the 
Western world.  The weighty influence of German constitutional law, which 
applied the doctrine, led to its incorporation first into the jurisprudence 
of the European Court of Human Rights54 and the European Court of 
52. Id. at 2852 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 53. Proportionality analysis is a central feature of what Weinrib calls “the postwar 
paradigm.”  Weinrib, supra note 25, at 84; see also sources cited supra note 4 
(explaining the proliferation of the proportionality paradigm). 
54. See Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1981), available
at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/47fdfaf7d.html; Handyside v. United Kingdom, 
24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1976), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/ 
3ae6b6fb8.html.  See generally Marc-André Eissen, The Principle of Proportionality in the 
Case-Law of the European Court of Human Rights, in THE EUROPEAN SYSTEM FOR THE 
PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 125, 126–31 (R. St. J. Macdonald et al. eds., 1993). 
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Justice,55 and then in 1986, it traveled to Canada.56  This process sped up 
in the 1990s, at which time proportionality was adopted in almost every 
European country, as well as in many countries outside Europe.  Today, 
proportionality is an accepted doctrine in Ireland,57 South Africa,58 Israel,59
Australia,60 New Zealand,61 and many more countries.62  It seems that 
the United States is the last system in the West to resist the appeal of the 
proportionality doctrine.63
Justice Breyer is likely well aware of these developments in global 
constitutional law and of the centrality of proportionality in other legal 
systems.  Breyer is one of the leading American Justices in the field of 
comparative constitutional law and is an ambassador of sorts for the 
Supreme Court in other countries.  Speaking fluent French, he appears 
regularly at international gatherings of jurists and international 
conferences, all of which include a fair share of proportionality analysis.64
Ultimately, Breyer’s deep knowledge of comparative constitutional law, 
and his specific acquaintance with the doctrine of proportionality and the 
 55. Case 222/84, Johnston v. Chief Constable, 1986 E.C.R. 1651, 1685–87. 
 56. R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, 135–42 (Can.). 
 57. Blascaod Mor Teoranta v. Comm’rs of Pub. Works, [1998] I.E.H.C. 38, ¶¶ 49–
64 (27th February, 1998) (H.Ct.) (Ir.) available at http://www.bailii.org/ie/cases 
/IEHC/1998/38.html (last visited May 31, 2009). 
58. S v Zuma & Others 1995 (2) SA 642 (CC) (S. Afr.). 
 59. CA 6821/93 United Mizrahi Bank Ltd. v. Migdal Coop. Vill. [1995] IsrSC 
49(4) 221, 280–85, 325–31. 
 60. Kartinyeri v. Commonwealth (1998) 152 A.L.R. 540 (Austl.). 
 61. Ministry of Transp. v. Noort, [1992] 3 N.Z.L.R. 260, 282–85 (C.A.). 
 62. For Brazil, see Alonso Reis Freire, Evolution of Constitutional Interpretation 
in Brazil and the Employment of Balancing “Method” by Brazilian Supreme Court in 
Judicial Review 7–11 (n.d.) (unpublished conference paper, on file with author), 
available at http://www.enelsyn.gr/papers/w15/Paper%20by%20Prof%20Alonso%20Reis 
%20Freire.pdf.  For Korea, see JEON Hak-Seon, L’application du principe de 
proportionnalité dans la Justice constitutionnelle en Corée (n.d.) (unpublished conference 
paper, on file with author), available at http://www.enelsyn.gr/papers/w15/Paper%20by 
%20Prof.%20JEON%20Hak-Seon.pdf.  Both papers were presented at the VIIth World 
Congress of the International Association of Constitutional Law. 
 63. Gardbaum, supra note 23, at 424 (proposing if “U.S. courts engage in second-
step analysis at all, they reject the near-universal proportionality test in favor of the more 
categorical, rule-like, fixed tiers or standards of review”); see also Vicki C. Jackson, 
Ambivalent Resistance and Comparative Constitutionalism: Opening up the Conversation on 
“Proportionality,” Rights and Federalism, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 583, 603 (1999) (“U.S. 
constitutional law does not ordinarily and explicitly resort to the idea of proportionality 
as a measure of constitutionality.”). 
64. See Salzburg Global Seminar, supra note 6; see also Richard A. Posner, 
Justice Breyer Throws Down the Gauntlet, 115 YALE L.J. 1699, 1715 (2006) (noting the 
fact that Justice Breyer is fluent in French). 
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extent of its influence in Europe and elsewhere, further indicates that his 
reference to proportionality in Heller was not mere coincidence. 
Justice Breyer’s reference to foreign constitutional law in Heller is 
novel and unique in two ways.  First, for what appears to be the first time in 
the ongoing foreign law debate, a foreign methodology or doctrine—and 
not foreign substantive ideas or solutions—was invoked.65  Because 
proportionality does not include any substantive commitments and instead 
provides only an analytical framework for rights adjudication,66 Breyer’s 
foreign law reference in Heller stands in sharp contrast to the Roper,
Atkins, Lawrence, and Grutter decisions in which the Justices who invoked 
foreign law did so in order to bolster their substantive conclusions 
regarding the interpretation of the Constitution.67  In particular, foreign 
law was invoked in both Roper and Lawrence as proof of consensus 
among members of the international community regarding standards of 
morality, which can constitute prima facie justification for the recognition 
of those standards by the Supreme Court.68
There are at least two advantages to this shift in strategy from substance 
to methodology.  First, unlike substantive commitments, methodology 
seems more neutral and technical and therefore attracts less attention and 
criticism.  Second, an imported methodological framework might prove to 
be even more effective than imported substantive ideas in terms of 
Supreme Court recognition of foreign law.  A shared methodology better 
facilitates dialogue in future cases and could lay the foundation for the 
introduction of substantive ideas in the future.  Indeed, the reluctance of 
the American judiciary to adopt proportionality analysis is an obstacle to 
constitutional dialogue with other legal systems.  Justice Breyer therefore 
laid the groundwork for smoother dialogue with other countries.  Indeed, 
the incorporation of proportionality into legal systems has often coincided 
with an intensified engagement in comparative constitutional law. 
The second facet of the Heller reference to foreign law that 
distinguishes it from others is the fact that it is covert rather than overt.  
Justice Breyer did not directly invoke foreign constitutional law, and his 
 65. For a distinction between methodological and substantive forms of American 
exceptionalism, see Gardbaum, supra note 23, at 422–24, and Schauer, The Exceptional 
First Amendment, supra note 24, at 30. 
 66. See, for example, R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697 (Can.), in which 
Canadian Chief Justice Dickson remarks:  
The analytical framework of Oakes [that is, proportionality analysis] has been 
continually reaffirmed by this Court, yet it is dangerously misleading to conceive 
of s. 1 as a rigid and technical provision, offering nothing more than a last chance 
for the state to justify incursions into the realm of fundamental rights. 
Id. at 735. 
67. See supra notes 30–33 and accompanying text. 
68. See supra notes 31, 33. 
PORAT_FINAL_ARTICLE[1] 7/7/2009 3:11:15 PM 
[VOL. 46:  367, 2009] The Hidden Foreign Law Debate in Heller
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
 383
opinion cited no foreign sources.69  Moreover, in two separate parts of 
his opinion, he made a point of stressing that his analysis rested firmly 
on prevailing American constitutional jurisprudence.70  This seems a 
clear attempt to use the term and the doctrine of proportionality without 
being explicit about their source.  Breyer thus circumvented the criticism 
that usually ensues after open reliance on foreign norms, as well as the 
accompanying legitimacy problems.  Under this approach, foreign ideas 
are attributed with American credentials and gain legitimacy by being 
presented as a natural development of American constitutional law. 
Justice Breyer’s approach was not, in fact, a novel strategy for 
incorporating foreign law into domestic constitutional law, or even for 
specifically incorporating the doctrine of proportionality.  Indeed, in the 
landmark Oakes decision, which introduced proportionality into Canadian 
constitutional law, Chief Justice Dickson presented the doctrine as an 
internal Canadian constitutional legal development and as the product of 
interpretation of the Canadian Charter of Human Rights; he made no 
reference to European constitutional law, which has almost exactly the 
same structure of proportionality.71
Justice Breyer’s awareness of the advantages inherent in covertly 
referencing foreign law possibly arose during a televised debate with 
Justice Scalia in January 2005, three years before the Heller decision.  In 
discussing reliance upon foreign law in American jurisprudence, Scalia 
said to Breyer, “Look, I’m not preventing you from reading these 
[foreign law] cases. . . .  I mean, go ahead and indulge your curiosity!  Just 
don’t put it in your opinions!”72  In Heller, then, Breyer was simply adopting 
 69. The only reference to foreign law was in the context of checking the 
correlation between gun control laws and murder rates.  See District of Columbia v. 
Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2858 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[R]espondent’s amici
point to a statistical analysis that regresses murder rates against the presence or absence 
of strict gun laws in 20 European nations.”); see also Brief of Criminologists et al. as 
Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 23, District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 
2783 (2008) (No. 07-290), 2008 WL 383535 (citing Don B. Kates & Gary Mauser, 
Would Banning Firearms Reduce Murder and Suicide?: A Review of International and 
Some Domestic Evidence, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 649, 651–94 (2007)). 
70. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2847–48, 2850–51 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 71. R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, 136–37 (Can.).  In addition, Grimm, supra
note 4, 383–84, raises the question of whether Chief Justice Dickson, in writing the 
Oakes decision, had been guided by foreign examples or had in fact developed the test 
completely on his own.  Grimm then notes that “[t]he German and Canadian 
proportionality tests differ slightly in their terminology.”  Id. at 384. 
72. The Relevance of Foreign Legal Materials in U.S. Constitutional Cases: A 
Conversation Between Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Stephen Breyer, supra note 28,
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the advice of his fellow Justice and keeping the debate behind the 
scenes.  The Court’s shift towards covert reference to foreign law also 
accords with what seems to be its general backing down from references 
to foreign legal materials.  This retreat from openly referring to foreign 
sources, which is most likely due to the criticism it attracts, is evidenced 
by the fact that the Court has not referred to any foreign legal materials 
since the Roper case, despite having some fitting opportunities to do 
so.73
There are, however, obvious disadvantages to covert use of foreign 
law.  One is that the lack of transparency prevents debate and discussion 
regarding the merits of using the given norm.  The rest of the discussion 
in this Article is thus devoted to a consideration of how the debate would 
have transpired among the Justices had Breyer made explicit mention of 
European proportionality.  The aim will be to take a closer look at the 
Breyer claim that the Supreme Court has applied the proportionality 
approach “in various constitutional contexts.”74  Indeed, the hypothetical 
debate likely would have addressed the questions of precisely what 
adopting proportionality would entail, and how big an impact it would 
have on prevailing American constitutional law.  In considering these 
questions, this Article compares European proportionality with American 
balancing and ultimately finds support for Breyer’s claim on the doctrinal 
level, but difficulties in the broader context. 
III. INTRINSIC BALANCING AND BOUNDED BALANCING
This section addresses the question of whether the general doctrinal 
constructs of European proportionality can be found in American 
constitutional law and concludes that, at least on the doctrinal level, 
at 534.  There is another passage in the same televised debate that illustrates a very 
similar point.  Justice Breyer, in recounting a conversation that he had with a congressman, 
stated: 
I said to the congressman, “If I have a difficult case and a human being called 
a judge, though of a different country, has had to consider a similar problem, 
why should I not read what that judge has said?  It will not bind me, but I may 
learn something.”  The congressman replied, “Fine.  You are right.  Read it.  
Just don’t cite it in your opinion.” 
Id. at 522. 
 73. One such obvious opportunity to cite foreign legal materials was Kennedy v. 
Louisiana, which ruled that it is unconstitutional to impose the death penalty for the 
crime of raping a child.  128 S. Ct. 2641, 2675–77 (2008).  The decision turned over the 
same legal questions that were posed in the Roper case—determining the evolving 
standards of morality regarding the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishment 
Clause—yet, unlike his decision in Roper, Justice Kennedy, who wrote the majority 
opinion, did not cite to any foreign legal material. 
74. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2852 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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Breyer might have had a valid point in Heller.75  However, taking into 
account the historical, cultural, and institutional characteristics of America 
and Europe, balancing and proportionality are situated in significantly 
different ways. 
A.  Balancing and Proportionality: Doctrinal Similarities                              
and Beyond 
Conceptually, balancing and proportionality seem to be distinct 
doctrines with different connotations.  Proportionality seems to set out 
by first considering one object and then asking whether another object is 
proportional to that first object.  Balancing, in contrast, seems to lack 
any similar sense of a starting point; rather, it compares two objects 
without according any preference to either one.76  However, this conceptual 
difference is of minor practical import because the two doctrines involve 
very similar thought processes: both assess the extent of rights 
infringement and the relative necessity of the infringement for realizing 
state interests. 
As with European proportionality, in American constitutional law, 
balancing the comparative importance of the infringed right with the 
governmental interests comes after conducting the tests to filter out 
superfluous government means.  In American law, these tests—which 
comprise the first and second prongs of European proportionality—are 
conglomerated into the well-known least restrictive means test, which is 
associated with balancing.  Recall that there are three stages to 
proportionality: the first two stages—rational connection and least 
restrictive means—entail a means-ends analysis, while the third step is a 
balancing test that contemplates proportionality in its strict sense—
balancing the benefits against the costs.  Arguably, all three stages of the 
proportionality analysis exist in American constitutional law.  As to the 
first two stages of proportionality, which concern means-end analyses, 
they exist explicitly in the well-known levels of scrutiny tests, which are 
 75. Although this Article sides with a revisionist approach regarding the difference 
in terms of one-step analysis versus two-step analysis, this support is limited to the 
specific context of this aspect; it does not extend to other structural and nonsubstantive 
differences.  For example, Part II argues that there is a strong difference between the 
American and European constitutional systems in terms of positive versus negative 
rights and the application of constitutional rights in the private sphere. 
 76. For an overview of the use of the scales metaphor, see Dennis E. Curtis & 
Judith Resnik, Images of Justice, 96 YALE L.J. 1727, 1741 n.32 (1987). 
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applied in different degrees of rigorousness in American constitutional 
law.  Basically, the same two questions that proportionality weighs are 
being asked in the American tests as well: whether the means taken by 
the government further a governmental end, and whether they are the 
least restrictive means by which the government can pursue that goal.77
The balancing test that is the third stage of proportionality is present 
both implicitly in the least restrictive means requirement and explicitly 
in many different direct applications of balancing,78 which occur in 
contexts ranging from low-level speech, to the commerce clause, to due 
process.79
Notwithstanding these similarities between European and American 
legal analysis, proportionality is arguably unique in that it consolidates 
the aforementioned analytical elements in an orderly and consecutive 
manner under the umbrella of one doctrine.  If this is indeed the case, 
Justice Breyer’s introduction of proportionality is no more than an 
ordering and organizing of preexisting components of American 
constitutional law.  Thus, although an undeniably important move in 
itself, Breyer’s approach does not amount to creating something new, 
and instead supports a general argument, such as that made by David 
Law, that a generic constitutional law structure exists in every constitutional 
system, including American constitutional law.80
Therefore, at the doctrinal level, Justice Breyer and critics of 
American exceptionalism are correct in claiming that the proportionality 
approach is at least latently present in American constitutional law.  The 
doctrinal level, however, does not paint the entire picture.  There are real 
differences in the ways these similar doctrines function and in the 
meanings they are assigned, as well as in the respective attitudes towards 
them in America and elsewhere.  This conclusion accords with several 
comparative scholars who have argued for a more contextual approach 
in comparative constitutional law.  Mark Tushnet and Pierre Legrand, 
amongst others, have strongly advocated for such contextualism, 
 77. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1336 
(2007).
78. Id. at 1306–08; Guy Miller Struve, The Less-Restrictive-Alternative Principle 
and Economic Due Process, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1463, 1463–64 (1967); Note, Less 
Drastic Means and the First Amendment, 78 YALE L.J. 464, 468 (1969). 
 79. Aleinikoff, supra note 47, at 963–67 (documenting the spread of balancing in 
American constitutional law); see also Ian Ayres & Sydney Foster, Don’t Tell, Don’t 
Ask: Narrow Tailoring After Grutter and Gratz, 85 TEX. L. REV. 517 (2007) (discussing 
the use of balancing in affirmative action cases). 
 80. Law, supra note 4, at 659. 
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warning against facile comparisons that do not take into account deeper 
constructs of cultures, institutions, and attitudes.81
In another essay, we addressed the historical differences between 
balancing and proportionality.  A comparative historical account of the 
different purposes and ends of balancing in American constitutional law 
and proportionality in European constitutional law suggests that proportionality 
was used in nineteenth-century Germany to introduce rights into a system 
lacking constitutional protections, whereas balancing was developed in the 
United States in the early twentieth century to limit rights accorded 
absolute protection by the Lochner Court.82  This Article presents a 
related account of the development of the two doctrines, emphasizing 
political culture and the respective conceptions of the polity in the two 
systems.  This account reveals that proportionality in Germany is based 
on an organic conception of the state and operates to moderate and 
navigate the realization of commonly shared social values and interests.  
In the United States, greater public suspicion of the Court and government 
has led to a more minor and subsidiary role for balancing, bounded by a 
more categorical approach towards rights.  Balancing in America is 
instrumental in smoking out illicit motives, serves as proxy for a categorical 
approach, and when true balancing does take place, is subsidiary and 
applied in a pragmatic fashion.  Thus, German proportionality and the
American doctrine of balancing represent two types of balancing: the 
latter the bounded sense of balancing and the former intrinsic balancing. 
B. The Intrinsic Sense of Balancing in Germany 
This Article focuses on Germany as reflecting European proportionality 
for two reasons.  The first and more obvious reason is that Germany is 
81. See, e.g., Pierre Legrand, European Legal Systems Are Not Converging, 45 
INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 52, 55–60 (1996); Mark Tushnet, The Possibilities of Comparative 
Constitutional Law, 108 YALE L.J. 1225, 1300 (1999); Mark Tushnet, Some Reflections 
on Method in Comparative Constitutional Law, in THE MIGRATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
IDEAS, supra note 25, at 67, 81 (arguing for a combination of the universal and 
contextual approaches in comparative constitutional law; the universal approach allows 
us to understand which of the legal arrangements constitute a false necessity, whereas the 
contextual approach reminds us that constitutional law is deeply embedded in the 
cultural, doctrinal, and social contexts of each country). 
 82. Iddo Porat & Moshe Cohen-Eliya, American Balancing and German 
Proportionality: The Historical Origins 13, 26 (Sept. 23, 2008) (unpublished paper), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1272763. 
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where the doctrine originated.83  The second reason is the tremendous
influence of German constitutional law in general and its application of 
proportionality in particular, due to the fact that decisions of the Federal 
Constitutional Court are cited in the decisions of many other legal 
systems across the globe.84  The German conception of balancing revolves 
around intrinsic values.  Balancing expresses values of compromise, 
mediation, and pluralism.  This intrinsic sense of balancing is tied to an 
organic conception of the state, under which all organs trust one another 
and cooperate to realize common values that express the spirit of the 
nation.
1.  The German Organic Conception of the State 
The terrible outcome of the Second World War ignited a debate over 
the political morality that should guide the constitution of the new 
Germany.  In his seminal work The German Idea of Freedom, Leonard 
Krieger argued that in light of the moral bankruptcy of nationalism, 
Germany should depart from its communitarian heritage and adopt a 
more neutral, suspicion-based constitution, one that guaranteed negative 
liberties for all its citizens and set strict limits on the government.85
 83. The first reference to proportionality can be found in the Allgemeines 
Landrecht, the Prussian General Code of 1794, which authorized the government to 
exercise police powers in order to ensure public order, but at the same time also limited 
those powers to such measures that are essential for achieving that goal.  The pertinent 
section stated that “the police is to take the necessary measures for the maintenance of 
public peace, security and order.”  ALLGEMEINES LANDRECHT FÜR DIE PREUßISCHEN
STAATEN VON 1794 [PRUSSIAN GENERAL CODE], pt. II, tit. 17, § 10, translated in Stone 
Sweet & Mathews, supra note 4, at 101 (emphasis added).  The principle of 
proportionality was developed in the writings of nineteenth-century German 
constitutional scholars and became judicial doctrine in the Prussian Supreme 
Administrative Court (1882–1941).  See Kenneth F. Ledford, Formalizing the Rule of 
Law in Prussia: The Supreme Administrative Law Court, 1876–1914, 37 CENT. EUR.
HIST. 203, 222 (2004); see also Stone Sweet & Mathews, supra note 4, at 97–111 
(providing discussions on Germany). 
 84. Jeffrey B. Hall, Taking “Rechts” Seriously: Ronald Dworkin and the Federal 
Constitutional Court of Germany, 9 GERMAN L.J. 771, 771 (2008), http://www. 
germanlawjournal.com/pdf/Vol09No06/PDF_Vol_09_No_06_771-98_Articles_Hall.pdf 
(“Over the past 60 years the German Basic Law has become one of the most influential 
constitutional systems in the world.”).  Hall makes reference to Juliane Kokott, From
Reception and Transplantation to Convergence of Constitutional Models in the Age of 
Globalization—with Special Reference to the German Basic Law, in CONSTITUTIONALISM,
UNIVERSALISM, AND DEMOCRACY—A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 71 (Christian Starck ed., 
1999), which catalogs and analyzes the extensive reception of the German Basic Law in 
constitutions throughout the world, and Donald P. Kommers, Germany: Balancing 
Rights and Duties, in INTERPRETING CONSTITUTIONS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 161, 161–
62, 201–02 (Jeffrey Goldsworthy ed., 2006). 
 85. LEONARD KRIEGER, THE GERMAN IDEA OF FREEDOM 470 (1957) (arguing for a 
position that “views the state as a morally neutral, purely utilitarian organization of 
public power”); see also DONALD P. KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF 
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Although sound at first glance, it appears that this “American-style” 
solution of state neutrality and negative rights was inappropriate for 
post-World War II Germany.  First, adhering to state neutrality would 
also entail neutrality towards the racist attitudes that were prevalent in a 
society in which the large majority of the population was raised on the 
value of Aryan superiority.  Indeed, an ambitious project lay behind the 
formulation of the postwar German constitution: the goal was to bring 
about a profound transformation of German consciousness and attitudes 
such that the values upon which human rights are based would become 
acknowledged and internalized.86  This aim could only be realized by 
according the state a nonneutral stance in society.  Secondly, the “neutral” 
approach does not conform to traditional German political theory, which 
is Hegelian and Aristotelian in orientation.  Under this tradition, the state 
is not conceived as merely an aggregate of individuals who live in a 
given territory and coordinate their activities by means of the state, but 
instead as a union of people who have a shared system of values and 
endeavor to promote them.87  Rather than the atomized conception of the 
THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 33 (2d ed. 1997); Girish N. Bhat, Recovering the 
Historical Rechtsstaat, 32 REV. CENT. & E. EUR. L. 65, 88–89 (2007). 
86. See Clemens Jabloner, Hans Kelsen: Introduction, in WEIMAR: A JURISPRUDENCE 
OF CRISIS 67, 73 (Arthur J. Jacobson & Bernhard Schlink eds., Belinda Cooper et al. 
trans., 2000) (arguing that the concepts of formal democracy and neutrality that guided 
the Weimar Republic were reasons for its constitutional collapse); Donald P. Kommers,
German Constitutionalism: A Prolegemenon, 40 EMORY L.J. 837, 852–53, 861 (1991) 
(explaining that the trauma of the Second World War has led many German theorists to 
suggest a departure from neutral principles of formalism and to adopt a natural law 
approach). 
 87. The German fundamental concept of the Rechtsstaat—“a state governed by 
law”—differs from the common law concept of rule of law, in that it is tied to an organic 
conception of the state that seeks to integrate state and society.  See KOMMERS, supra
note 85, at 36; HANS ROSENBERG, POLITISCHE DENKSTRÖMUNGEN IM DEUTCHEN 
VORMÄRZ 37 (1972) (arguing that the state is viewed not only as an institutional 
safeguard to protect individual rights, but also as “Vaterland”); RUDOLF SMEND,
VERFASSUNG UND VERFASSUNGSRECHT (1928) (stating the role of the constitution and of 
constitutional interpretation is to integrate society around shared values); OTTO VON 
GIERKE, THE DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL THEORY (Bernard Freyd trans., Howard Fertig, 
Inc. 1966) (1939) (original German version appeared in 1880); Mathias Reimann, 
Nineteenth Century German Legal Science, 31 B.C. L. REV. 837 (1990) (discussing the 
influence of Hegelian and communitarian ideas on nineteenth-century German legal 
science).  On Smend’s influential integration theory, see also Stefan Korioth, Rudolph 
Smend: Introduction, in WEIMAR: A JURISPRUDENCE OF CRISIS, supra note 86, at 207.
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self, the German political theory of the “separateness of the person”88
emphasizes that a person is embedded in a community that shares 
common values and expresses solidarity towards all members of that 
community.  Accordingly, in 1954, the Federal German Constitutional 
Court (FGCC) ruled that: 
The Basic Law’s idea of man is not the idea of an isolated sovereign individual; 
rather, the Basic Law has decided the tension between individuals and society in 
favor of the individual being community related and community bound—while 
not touching its intrinsic value.89
State organs therefore play an important role in realizing common 
values.  Naturally, such an organic conception of the state is trust-
oriented: It is constructed on a premise of reciprocal cooperation and 
trust amongst all state organs and assumes that all state organs have 
legitimate interests that should be optimized.  The functioning of the 
FGCC should be understood in light of this organic conception.  Unlike 
the U.S. perception of courts, constitutional judges in Germany are not 
expected to fulfill a classic antimajoritarian task.  As Alec Stone Sweet 
explains, in Germany, as in Europe in general, the Constitutional Court 
does not conduct judicial review in the typical antimajoritarian sense that 
many Europeans oppose.  Instead, the court is viewed as a political 
organ that constitutes an integral part of the state and shares with the 
state the task of elaborating and shaping social values and norms.90  This 
conception of the court’s role, which reflects and derives from the 
organic approach to the state, may account for the fact that, in Germany, 
there is much less criticism of judicial review for being countermajoritarian.91
 88. The concept of the separateness of the person is central in liberalism and in 
libertarianism.  See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 32–33 (1974); JOHN 
RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 27 (1971).
 89. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] July 20, 
1954, 4 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 7 (¶¶ 15–16) 
(F.R.G.) (author’s translation), available at http://www.servat.unibe.ch/dfr/bv004007.html. 
 90. ALEC STONE SWEET, GOVERNING WITH JUDGES: CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN 
EUROPE 32, 40 (2000).
 91. It is true that, in the 1960s, there was some criticism of the broad role of the 
court and its extensive reference to abstract values.  Carl Schmitt and other German legal 
scholars have attacked the Constitutional Court on the grounds that it leads to the 
“tyranny of values” (“die tyrannei der werte”), primarily because values are of an 
abstract nature and their realization quite often leads to rulings that are in accordance 
with the particular judge’s own personal value system.  See ERNST FORSTHOFF, ZUR
PROBLEMATIK DER VERFASSUNGSAUSLEGUNG 19, 40 (1961); Carl Schmitt, Die
Tyrannei der Werte, in SÄKULARISATION UND UTOPIE: ERNST FORSTHOFF ZUM 65.
GEBURTSTAG 37, 39 (K. Doering & W.G. Greve eds., 1967); Wolfgang Zeidler, Grundrechte 
und Grundentscheidungen der Verfassung im Widerstreit, in VERHANDLUNGEN DES 
DREIUNDFÜNFZIGSTEN DEUTSCHEN JURISTENTAGES 6, 6–29 (1980).  This criticism, however, 
represents the minority stance in current German legal scholarship.  See Kommers, supra
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As Dieter Grimm has put it, “There is no preestablished difference 
between court and legislatures which a particular contribution has to 
adopt and which an interpreter has to enforce regardless of what the 
constitution says.  In addition, constitutional courts inevitably cross the 
line between law and politics.”92
Shortly after its establishment, the FGCC ruled that the constitution is 
governed by an objective and hierarchal set of values, the so-called 
Objective Wertrangordnung.93  This ruling did not mark a departure in 
any way from traditional German thought, which assigns the state a 
central role in realizing individual well-being and integrating individuals 
into a community with shared values.  The court did, however, change 
the contents of those common values in its ruling.  Rather than 
nationalistic values—such as Volksgeist, or “the spirit of the people,” 
which lay at the foundation of nineteenth-century German jurisprudence94
—the court deemed the dominating value of German society to be 
human dignity.95  This value, which now opens the German constitution, 
is absolute and constitutes the constitution’s Archimedes Point.96
note 86, at 842 (stating that “the source and authority of the Federal Constitutional Court 
are relatively undisputed”). 
 92. KOMMERS, supra note 85, at 44 (referencing Grimm’s comments that appear in 
Dieter Grimm, Comment, in CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW AND LEGISLATION: AN
INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON 169, 169 (Christian Landfried ed., 1988)). 
 93. Article 117 Case, Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional 
Court] Dec. 18, 1953, 3 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 225 
(232) (F.R.G.) (author’s translation), cited in KOMMERS, supra note 85, at 47–48 (noting 
that the Constitutional Court rejected “value-free legal positivism” and that the Court in 
the first years “appeared to accept natural law as an independent standard of review”). 
 94. Reimann, supra note 87, at 853.  To Savigny, one of the leading legal scholars 
in nineteenth-century Germany, Volksgeist does not stand for “culture” in the 
anthropological sense, but rather in the intellectual sense; Volksgeist was the organic 
development of the law’s intellectual underlying principles.  Id. 
 95. Article 1(1) of the German Basic Law, 1949, provides: “Human dignity shall 
be inviolable.  To respect and protect it shall be the duty of all state authority.”
GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [Constitution] art. 1(1) (F.R.G.), available at http://www.bundestag. 
de/interakt/infomat/fremdsprachiges_material/downloads/ggEn_download.pdf (English 
translation).  In the Microsenzus case, Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal 
Constitutional Court] July 16, 1969, 27 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts 
[BVerfGE] 1 (F.R.G.), the FGCC ruled that “[h]uman Dignity is at the very top of the 
value order of the Basic Law.”  Id. (author’s translation). 
 96. Kommers, supra note 86, at 855. 
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2.  Proportionality as an Intrinsic Element of the Organic               
Conception of the State
In addition to being closely tied to the German organic conception of 
the polity, the doctrine of proportionality is widely conceived as the 
main tool by which the organic conception is realized in the 
jurisprudence of the Federal Constitutional Court.  Proportionality in 
Germany is not only a conflict-resolving means, but it is also applied to 
harmonize and integrate the various state organs around shared values.97
German constitutional scholars do not speak of proportionality in terms 
of a pragmatic enterprise involving some sort of cost-benefit analysis.  
Rather, they take a more idealistic view of the doctrine, as necessary for 
the optimization of values.98  Proportionality thus serves as the primary 
methodology for maintaining the integrity and “unity of values” of the 
Basic Law.99  As first stated by Konrad Hesse, the late Constitutional 
Court justice: 
The principle of the constitution’s unity requires the optimization of [values in 
conflict]: Both legal values need to be limited so that each can attain its optimal 
effect.  In each concrete case, therefore, the limitation must satisfy the principle 
of proportionality; that is, they may not go any further than necessary to 
produce a concordance of both legal values.100
Proportionality, which is also closely related to the principle requiring
harmonic interpretation of the German constitution, or “praktische 
Korkordanz,”101 thus functions as a central mechanism for enhancing 
harmony and cooperation between conflicting values in the German 
society.  The fact that proportionality serves to ensure the realization of 
abstract constitutional values and makes them meaningful in concrete 
cases traces back to the German conception of value order.  Conflicts in 
Germany are perceived as transpiring entirely within the constitutional 
sphere—both interests and rights derive from the constitution.  The main 
concern of proportionality, then, is to determine which of the interests or 
 97. GRUNDGESETZ: KOMMENTAR 94, 95 (Michael Sachs ed., 1996). 
98. See KOMMERS, supra note 85, at 46–47; KONRAD HESSE, GRUNDZÜGE DES 
VERFASSUNGSRECHTS DER BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTCHLAND 27 (1988), translated in 
Kommers, supra note 86, at 851 n.43. 
 99. In the Southwest State case, Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal 
Constitutional Court] Oct. 23, 1951, 1 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts 
[BVerfGE] 14 (F.R.G.), the court first set the “unity of values” principle and held that 
“every constitutional provision must always be interpreted in such a way as to render it 
compatible with the fundamental principles of the constitution.”  Id. (author’s translation). 
 100. HESSE, supra note 98, at 27, quoted and translated in KOMMERS, supra note 
85, at 46. 
101. Id. at 30–31. 
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rights in conflict best further the ultimate shared goals of the 
constitutional order.  In addition, as noted, the organic conception of the 
polity makes the policymaking aspects of proportionality less problematic 
in the German constitutional regime, and it is the Constitutional Court’s 
manifest task to instantiate the abstract values of the constitution in 
particular cases.  Thus, rather than being perceived as illegitimate judicial 
intervention in policymaking, balancing is viewed in Germany, and 
elsewhere on the Continent, as the objective, systematic, and logical 
implementation of constitutional rights, while realizing values in everyday 
life is considered to be the quintessential task of the court.102
The centrality of the doctrine of proportionality in Constitutional 
Court jurisprudence is evidenced clearly in its ruling that proportionality 
emerges “basically from the nature of constitutional rights themselves.”103
Indeed, Robert Alexy has gone so far as to assert that proportionality 
“logically follows from the nature of [rights as] principles; it can be 
deduced from them.”104  Thus, the doctrine of proportionality is understood 
in Germany as inherent to the constitution, despite the absence of any 
explicit reference to it therein.105
Two Constitutional Court cases are illustrative of how proportionality 
analysis operates in light of the organic conception of the state.  In 
Mephisto, the court dealt with the constitutionality of a judicial order 
banning the distribution of Klaus Mann’s Mephisto, on the grounds that 
it slandered the reputation of a deceased Nazi collaborator.106  In 
 102. Jacco Bomhoff, Lüth’s 50th Anniversary: Some Comparative Observations on 
the German Foundations of Judicial Balancing, 9 GERMAN L.J. 121, 124 (2008), 
http://www.germanlawjournal.com/pdf/Vol09No02/PDF_Vol_09_No_02_121-124_Articles_ 
Bomhoff.pdf.
 103. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Dec. 15, 
1965, 19 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 342 (348) (F.R.G.) 
(author’s translation). 
 104. ROBERT ALEXY, A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 66 (Julian Rivers 
trans., 2002). 
 105. In most post-World War II constitutional and international documents, there is 
an explicit textual basis for proportionality analysis.  See Grimm, supra note 4, at 383–
84 (noting that, in the case of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 
“proportionality appears to be a genuine interpretation of the words ‘reasonable limits . . . as 
can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society’”).  In Germany, however, 
the constitutional text lacks such explicit reference.  The Constitutional Court derived the 
principle of proportionality from the Rechtsstaat but without explaining why.  See id. at 
385.
 106. Mephisto case, Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional 
Court] Feb. 24, 1971, 30 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 173 
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balancing the right to reputation and free artistic speech, the court 
deliberated which of the conflicting values had the stronger link to the 
paramount value of human dignity.107  The court’s decision in favor of 
the right to reputation—and to ban the book’s distribution—meant that 
the balancing process more strongly promoted the German value order 
that prescribed “man as an autonomous person who develops freely 
within the social community.”108
A more nuanced application of proportionality analysis can be found 
in the Lebach decision.109  In Lebach, the court addressed the question of 
whether a television station could broadcast a documentary exposing the 
sexual orientation of a prisoner who was about to be released.110  The 
court weighed the extent to which the broadcast would harm the right to 
privacy and the extent of harm to free speech that would ensue from 
banning the program in light of the paramount value of human 
dignity.111  This time, however, the court stressed that it would not 
abstractly rank the competing rights.112  Rather, the process of mediation 
and harmonization between rights must take place on an ad hoc basis, 
with respective extents of harm measured in light of the circumstances 
of each given case.113  As a result, the court ruled that banning the 
reference to the prisoner’s sexual orientation in the broadcasting would 
better realize the supreme value of human dignity.114
Ultimately, it appears that proportionality analysis in Germany has 
four distinct intrinsic features.  First, primary focus is placed on the 
balancing stage—proportionality in its strict sense—rather than on the 
identification of the governmental goal or the means-ends analysis.115
Hence, balancing enjoys a central status in German constitutional law.  
Second, when conducting balancing analysis, the Constitutional Court 
considers which of the competing rights or values better optimizes the 
constitutional value order and, more specifically, which one more 
(F.R.G.), available at http://www.servat.unibe.ch/dfr/bv030173.html, summarized and 
partially translated in KOMMERS, supra note 85, at 301–04. 
107. Id.
108. Id.
 109. Lebach case, Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional 
Court] May 2, 1973, 35 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 202 
(F.R.G.), available at http://www.servat.unibe.ch/dfr/bv035202.html, summarized and 






 115. Grimm, supra note 4, at 393 (stating that “[t]he most striking difference 
between [Canada and Germany] is the high relevance of the third step of the 
proportionality test in Germany and its more residual function in Canada”). 
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strongly upholds the paramount value of human dignity.  Third, German 
balancing is always conducted in an ad hoc manner.  In Germany, this 
does not raise any issue of judicial legitimacy because, under the organic 
conception of the state, it is actually the court’s duty to realize these 
values in concrete cases.  Finally, this German model of intrinsic balancing 
presupposes that everything is in the constitution, and that there are no 
clear-cut distinctions between rights and interests or a priori preferences 
for either.116
C.  The Bounded Sense of Balancing in America 
Immediate important differences can be identified between German 
and American political cultures, which in turn impact the way that 
balancing is conceived and applied in America as opposed to the 
conception and application of proportionality in Germany.  In contrast to 
the German organic conception of the state and broad understanding of 
rights with no distinction between rights and interests, American 
constitutional culture holds a more traditional view of rights as strong 
trumps or side constraints vis-à-vis government action.  The American 
approach, which is the result of the great suspicion with which both 
government and the judiciary are regarded, clearly undermines the validity 
of balancing in America because balancing erodes the distinctiveness of 
rights versus interests and assigns courts broad discretion.  Historically, 
balancing entered the American legal system through the sphere of 
private law, where a clear-cut distinction between rights and interests 
was deemed conceptually problematic.117  Balancing only later spread to 
constitutional law, where it was initially used mainly to criticize, rather 
than bolster, judicial review.118  These shaky beginnings continue to 
frame the use of balancing in American constitutional law.  Thus, even 
as balancing has become a common phenomenon in American jurisprudence, 
it is still bounded, so to speak, by the narrow and categorical American 
 116. Kumm, supra note 4, at 165 (stating that, in Germany, rights are not conceived 
of as “trumps” or even “shields”); Julian Rivers, A Theory of Constitutional Rights and 
the British Constitution, in A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, supra note 104, at
xvii, xxxv–xxxvi (indicating that Alexy’s theory does not differentiate between rights 
and interests in that both are subject to the requirement of optimization, that is, to 
proportionality analysis). 
117. See Porat & Cohen-Eliya, supra note 82, at 20.
 118. The concept of balancing was used to criticize judicial review during the 
Lochner era.  Judicial review during that period was based on a clear separation between 
rights and interests, and balancing was used to attack this approach.  See id. at 26–27. 
PORAT_FINAL_ARTICLE[1] 7/7/2009 3:11:15 PM 
396
conception of rights, thereby remaining distinct from the intrinsic conception 
of balancing in Germany. 
1.  The Suspicion-Based Conception of the State in America 
Four key features of American constitutional law are clearly indicative 
of the suspicion-based American approach to the state: (1) the separation 
of powers scheme; (2) the conception of rights as trumps; (3) the notion 
of neutrality; and (4) the democratic conception of the Constitution. 
First, in contrast to the German organic conception of the state, the 
American conception of the state is characterized by a well-known 
distrust of government, deriving from the idea of individual autonomy 
and self-rule.119  This distrust extends to all branches of government, 
including the judiciary, and lies at the base of the particularly American 
emphasis on separation of powers:120 because no institution can be 
trusted not to overstep its legitimate bounds, power must be decentralized 
by clearly defining the limits of each branch of government and clearly 
separating them.121  Consequently, American constitutional culture focuses 
on setting limits on judicial power and distinguishing the judicial role 
from the roles of the other branches of government.122  This, of course, 
stands in stark contrast to the conception of the German Constitutional 
Court as operating between the lines of politics and law. 
Second, American constitutionalism is based on the conception of 
rights as trumps.  The American culture of distrust also bred a suspicion-
based approach to drafting the Constitution—clear rules for government 
and clear rights for citizens were crafted as a way of limiting 
government power.  That is, formulating constitutional rights in absolute 
terms was preferred to the complexity of allowing limitations on rights 
in some instances, and a clear-cut distinction between individual rights 
and governmental interests was preferred to blurred boundaries in order 
to safeguard individual autonomy and to constrain governmental power.123
 119. The most distinct exposition on the centrality of distrust in American political 
culture can be found in JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 102–03 (1980).
 120. See, for example, Rachel Barkow describing the American governmental 
system as one “whose hallmark is supposed to be the separation of powers,” in Rachel E. 
Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons from Administrative 
Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming Feb. 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=1114172. 
121. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 21 (1993) 
(explaining the intention of the framers that “[i]n a large republic, the various factions 
would offset each other”). 
122. See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 46–47
(1962).
 123. C. Edwin Baker, Limitations on Basic Human Rights—A View from the United 
States, in THE LIMITATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 75, 
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Third, diverging from the German conception of underlying values, 
the American concept of the polity is based on the Lockean notion of 
state neutrality and individual liberties.124  Developed in a historical 
period marked by the persecution of religious minorities in Europe, 
American constitutionalism seeks to allow maximum freedom for 
personal beliefs, and places significant value on allowing multiple and 
even conflicting ideologies to coexist within a shared political system.  
The Constitution supplies the infrastructure for democracy, but ideas and 
ideologies must not be governed or imposed through the Constitution; 
they must be hashed out through the democratic process.  According to 
Justice Holmes, the Constitution should enable people with extremely 
divergent views to be united under its umbrella.125
Finally, American constitutional law is based on a deep belief in 
representative democracy and the sovereignty of the people.  Since Marbury
v. Madison,126 judicial review and the upholding of the Constitution have 
been justified by the democratic principle of self-rule.127  That is, the 
Constitution represents a particularly long-lasting and fundamental means 
of democratic self-legislation; it represents the particular commitments 
that the American people undertook and set as higher law.  This conception 
of democratic self-rule—more so than the organic conception of the 
state—views the constitutional text that incorporates these commitments 
as of ultimate importance. 
76, 89 (Armand de Mestral et al. eds., 1986) (describing the American categorical 
approach to rights as opposed to approaches that expressly allow for the limitation of 
rights).
 124. There is wide consensus on the significant influence of Lockean philosophy on 
the American Bill of Rights, though there is dispute as to the centrality of the right to 
property—as manifested in Locke’s writings—in the American Constitution.  See, e.g.,
RICHARD EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 
17, 29 (1985); cf. Herman Schwartz, Property Rights and the Constitution: Will the Ugly 
Duckling Become a Swan?, 37 AM. U. L. REV. 9, 14–19 (1987) (questioning the strength 
of Locke’s influence on the founding fathers). 
 125. See Justice Holmes’s famous statement in his dissent for Lochner v. New York,
198 U.S. 45 (1905): “[A] constitution is not intended to embody a particular economic 
theory, whether of paternalism and the organic relation of the citizen to the State or of 
laissez faire.  It is made for people of fundamentally differing views.”  Id. at 75–76 
(Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 126. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 127. See, for example, Jed Rubenfeld arguing that what distinguishes American 
constitutionalism is the conception of the Constitution as “the people’s self-given law.”  
Rubenfeld, supra note 19, at 2000. 
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2.  The Suspicion-Based Conception of the State and                           
Bounded Balancing 
Whereas under an organic conception of the state balancing is central 
to the judicial task of collaborative enhancement of values, it is a 
problematic mechanism under a suspicion-based conception.  First, the 
separation of powers doctrine and public wariness of the courts clash 
with balancing because it entails a considerable amount of judicial 
discretion, greater, at any rate, than that required by a rule-bound or 
categorical approach.128  Moreover, balancing appears to be almost 
inseparable from policymaking, which is a function assigned to the 
elected branches of government; this further infringes on the idea of 
separation of powers.129  Second, balancing also presents a problem from 
the perspective of the conception of rights as trumps: obscuring the 
distinction between rights and interests and allowing for rights to be 
more easily set aside due to state interests result in weaker limits on 
government.130 Third, judicial balancing undermines the neutrality value, 
for it entails substantive assessments of values by the Court as well as 
decisions on the appropriate resolution of conflicts between values.  And 
finally, balancing tends to prevent textual analysis because balancing is 
forward looking and involves consequentialist rather than interpretative 
questions.131
 128. Burt Neuborne argues that “judicial balancing has been subjected to deserved
academic criticism . . . because it licenses a judge to engage in overtly subjective 
decision-making that replicates and occasionally displaces, identical thought-processes 
already carried out by a politically responsible official.”  Burt Neuborne, Notes for a 
Theory of Constrained Balancing in First Amendment Cases: An Essay in Honor of Tom 
Emerson, 38 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 576, 578 (1988). 
 129. Thus, Ducat argues, “The approach to judicial decision-making, taken by 
interest balancers, is much like that taken by political actors staffing coordinate 
institutions of government who must themselves choose between rival group interests on 
issues of the day.”  CRAIG R. DUCAT, MODES OF CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 119
(1978).  Ducat continues, “[W]e need to know how the [balancing] technique of judicial 
review differs from legislative interest balancing,” and whether the principled quality of 
the judicial process can be sustained at all with interest balancing.  Id. at 133. 
130. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 198 (1977) (“The metaphor 
of balancing the public interest against personal claims is established in our political and 
judicial rhetoric, and this metaphor gives the model both familiarity and appeal.  
Nevertheless, the model is a false one . . . .”); see also Ronald Dworkin, Comment, It Is 
Absurd to Calculate Human Rights According to a Cost-Benefit Analysis, GUARDIAN 
(London), May 24, 2006, (Debate & Comment), at 28. 
 131. Laurent Frantz, who strongly objected to balancing in free speech during the 
1960s, maintained that instead of treating the Constitution as a higher law and applying it 
to the political organs, balancing treats the Constitution as if it were no law at all and 
simply allows the Court to second guess the wisdom, rather than the legality, of certain 
governmental decisions.  Frantz, supra note 47, at 1433, 1441, 1443; cf. Jackson, supra 
note 4, at 843 (arguing with regard to proportionality that it “may have little or no role on 
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3.  Bounded Balancing 
As a result of the skepticism with which balancing is treated and its 
clash with some of the basic tenets of American constitutionalism, its 
status in American constitutional law differs greatly from its status in 
German law.  In Germany, balancing stands front and center as a 
constitutional doctrine in the proportionality framework, while in 
America, it is generally assigned a more residual and instrumental role 
and is bounded by the categorical approach—hence its classification as 
“bounded balancing.” 
Precisely how American balancing is bounded can be illustrated by 
analogy to a typology proposed by Richard Fallon regarding the doctrine 
of strict scrutiny.132  Following Fallon, the proceeding sections identify 
three types of balancing in American constitutional case law.  The first is 
balancing as smoking out.  In this sense, balancing is an evidentiary tool 
used to smoke out a hidden illicit governmental motive.  This is termed 
instrumental balancing as distinguished from German balancing, which 
is attributed with intrinsic value.  The second type is balancing as an 
exception to the rule.  Here, balancing is a tool for maintaining categorical 
protection of rights by allowing for the balancing of rights against 
interests in exceptional cases of extraordinary circumstances.  This is 
termed residual balancing because balancing is conducted only as the 
exception.  Third, there is true balancing.  Even in instances of true 
balancing, as opposed to exceptional cases, it is applied in a pragmatic 
fashion, which differs substantially from the more idealistic and 
formalistic style of German proportionality.
a.  Balancing as Smoking Out 
Balancing is used to smoke out hidden unjustified ends in American 
constitutional law.  The judicial decisionmaking process in any given 
case is a categorical one, in that it identifies prohibited governmental 
constitutional issues generally regarded within the legal community as resolved by 
constitutional text itself”). 
132. See Fallon, supra note 77, at 1302–11.  Fallon distinguishes among the 
following three understandings of strict scrutiny: “Strict Scrutiny as a Nearly Categorical 
Prohibition,” “Strict Scrutiny as a Weighted Balancing Test,” and “Strict Scrutiny as an 
Illicit Motive Test.”  Id.  This Article correlates these three interpretations with the 
residual, true, and instrumental categories of balancing, respectively.  See discussion 
infra Part III.C.3.a–c. 
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purposes that are absolutely banned under the Constitution and deems 
them unconstitutional.  There is no balancing entailed in the reasoning 
underlying this process.  However, because prohibited purposes and motives 
of this kind can be camouflaged by the government as legitimate, and 
because it is difficult to find concrete evidence of prohibited purposes 
underlying governmental action, balancing becomes necessary.  In many 
instances, what is referred to as balancing is often simply a means for 
smoking out illegitimate governmental objectives. 
To this end, balancing can be used instrumentally in two ways.  First, 
balancing to smoke out illegitimate purposes can be conducted through 
its means-ends tests.133  These tests look for instances in which the 
means do not match the ends.  Assuming government rationality, such a 
lack of compatibility can be understood as indication that the stated ends 
are not the genuine ends.  There are two principal means-ends tests: the 
existence of a close connection between the means and the end, and the 
least restrictive alternative test.  Cass Sunstein’s description of these two 
tests as they are applied in the context of heightened scrutiny expresses 
well how they are actually used to smoke out hidden illegitimate 
purposes:
Heightened scrutiny involves two principal elements.  The first is a requirement 
that the government show a close connection between the asserted justification 
and the means that the legislature has chosen to promote it.  If a sufficiently 
close connection cannot be shown, there is a reason for skepticism that the 
asserted value in fact accounts for the legislation.  The second element is a 
search for less restrictive alternatives—ways in which the government could 
have promoted the public value without harming the group or interest in 
question.  The availability of such alternatives also suggests that the public 
value justification is a facade.134
An illustrative example of this smoking out is the Ho Ah Kow case, 
involving the so-called Queue Ordinance, enacted in 1873, that required 
the shaving of the heads of all inmates in San Francisco prisons.135
Prison hygiene—to prevent outbreaks of lice and fleas—was the alleged 
reason for this law, but in a lawsuit challenging the ordinance, the 
state court exposed this alleged justification as “mere pretense.”136
Using means–ends analysis to smoke out the true, illicit motive, the 
court reasoned that if hygiene were the actual purpose, the ordinance 
would be both underinclusive—it included only men and convicts and 
 133. It is sometimes argued that means-ends tests are not balancing tests at all.  
However, for the purposes of this Article, it suffices to acknowledge that means-ends 
tests are widely viewed as balancing tests, and moreover, in European law, they lie at the 
heart of the proportionality test. 
 134. SUNSTEIN, supra note 121, at 30. 
 135. Ho Ah Kow v. Nunan, 12 F. Cas. 252, 253 (C.C.D. Cal. 1879) (No. 6546). 
136. Id. at 254. 
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not women or detainees—and overinclusive—heads could be checked 
for lice instead of the sweeping measure of shaving heads.137  The real 
objective, the court revealed, was to stop the influx of impoverished 
Chinese immigrants—who were desperate for food and shelter—into 
the prisons by requiring them to shave off an important symbol in 
their culture.138  Thus, in showing that the means were unsuited to the 
end, the court found that the ordinance was in fact driven by racism and 
unconstitutional motives.
Second, even if the means and ends are suited, courts can conduct a 
stricter sense of balancing by comparing the importance of the end—the 
urgency of the government need—with the amount of harm wrought on 
the right.  Courts will strike down violations of rights when the harm is 
disproportionate either to the actual enhancement of the interest—when 
it is only marginal—or to the weight of the interest—when it is trivial.  
This balancing analysis can also be seen as a smoking out process.  
Because a rational actor would not ordinarily make such a poor tradeoff, 
it can be assumed that the government actor in such circumstances was 
motivated by goals other than those alleged.  An argument in this spirit 
can be found in the hypothetical in which a teacher segregates black 
pupils from white pupils in the classroom for aesthetic reasons.139
Although a perfect fit between the means—the separation—and the 
goal—aesthetics—is possible, the fact that the aesthetic goal is so trivial 
raises suspicion that it is nothing more than an attempt at rationalizing 
the racist motive. 
A concrete example of this type of smoking out can be found in 
Schneider, a well-known case from the 1930s in which the Supreme 
Court used balancing to deem unconstitutional a ban on the distribution 
of handbills in a city’s streets.140  Here, the Court identified protection of 
free speech and street cleanliness as two considerations in its decision 
and argued that the latter is of such negligible weight that it is easily 
overridden by the former.141  That is, in the balance between free speech 
and cleanliness in that particular case, free speech outweighed cleanliness.  
However, the use of balancing in Schneider can be understood as 
137. Id.
138. Id. at 255. 
 139. PAUL BREST, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 489 (1975); ELY, supra note 119, at 147–48. 
 140. Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 165 (1939). 
141. Id. at 163. 
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bounded balancing because it was used to smoke out illegitimate 
purposes rather than actually balance between the two interests.142  The 
Court undoubtedly suspected that the laws in question were not really 
motivated by concern for cleanliness, but rather by concern with the 
messages on the handbills.  This conclusion might have been based on 
the fact that the principal group distributing handbills was the Jehovah’s 
Witnesses, whose views were disturbing to many people at the time.143
However, as the Court could not easily prove that prejudice is what 
underlay the ban, it used balancing as evidence of the existence of a 
message-related purpose, which is unconstitutional under First Amendment 
protections.144  The triviality of the cleanliness interest relative to the 
free speech interest was proof that the true motive behind the regulation 
was the desire to exclude disturbing and unpopular religious views.145
As previously demonstrated, such an application of balancing is 
compatible with the suspiciousness of American political culture.  
Rather than engaging in intrinsic balancing, courts use the instrumental 
bounded balancing to uncover cases of illegitimate governmental behavior. 
b.  Balancing as the Exception Rather than the Rule 
Another way of understanding balancing as bounded in American 
constitutional law conceives of balancing as a kind of safety valve for 
exceptional occurrences in which rights protection would be extremely 
costly.  Under this approach, balancing occurs even when it is not used 
to smoke out illegitimate purposes; its use is limited in this context, and 
it represents the exception in terms of rights interpretation rather than the 
rule.  A prominent example of this type of balancing is the application of 
strict scrutiny review.  Although strict scrutiny does allow for balancing, 
it functions much more like a rule that bans certain considerations 
altogether, such as considerations based on racial distinction.  Balancing 
is allowed in extreme or exceptional cases in which the rule has to be set 
aside to avoid extreme outcomes.146  A second possible example is the 
“clear and present danger” test of American free speech jurisprudence 
142. Cf. Rubenfeld, supra note 47, at 831–32 (arguing that the ordinance in 
Schneider was targeted at speech). 
143. Schneider, 308 U.S. at 158. 
144. Id. at 163–65. 
145. Id.
146. See Fallon, supra note 77, at 1303–06 (arguing that strict scrutiny often 
functions as a “[n]early [c]ategorical [p]rohibition” on certain types of infringements of 
rights, and that balancing enters the analysis only in extreme circumstances and as an 
exception to the categorical rule). 
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from the early 1900s.147  This test allowed for the balancing of free speech 
against security or public safety concerns, but only when there was 
“clear and present danger” of public disorder.148  In effect, free speech was 
interpreted as setting a high bar for the regulation of opinions, and 
balancing was used only in the exceptional cases.149
The reason this type of balancing is termed “bounded” is because it is 
regarded as constrained by the rule rather than as describing the regular 
and standard template for rights analysis.  Unlike what has been referred 
to as the intrinsic sense of balancing, where the entire conception of 
rights is based on the idea of balancing them with other considerations, 
the American bounded approach is that balancing, even if it does exist, 
represents the exception and not the rule. 
c.  Balancing in the Strict Sense 
Admittedly, there are instances in American law in which “real” 
balancing occurs, that is, when the court is engaged in the comparison 
and accommodation of two competing interests or rights.  This model of 
balancing comes closest to German proportionality: it is founded on the 
notion of the possibility of legitimate interests in conflict that require 
mutual consideration, as opposed to cases in which an illegitimate 
interest needs to be smoked out.  However, in contrast to German 
proportionality, which is based on the ambitious goal of realizing the 
 147. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927); Gitlow v. New York, 268 
U.S. 652, 671 (1925); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 627–28 (1919) (Holmes, 
J., dissenting); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). 
 148. Jonathan S. Masur, Probability Thresholds, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1293, 1297 
(2007) (noting that “[t]rue balancing—a full accounting on each side of the ledger—
simply will not take place unless the probability of the asserted harm crosses the 
threshold”). 
 149. In addition, see Rubenfeld, supra note 47, stating: 
Despite appearances, the [clear and present danger test] cannot be understood 
as a balancing test.  It should be understood rather as a test to determine 
whether an individual has intentionally used speech so closely and directly 
engaged with a particularized course of prohibited conduct that the individual 
may be treated as having participated in that conduct. 
Id. at 829.  Rubenfeld continued: 
[The individual] can be punished for [participating in that conduct]—and not 
because the harmfulness of his speech outweighs its benefits.  The same line of 
thought explains the unprotectedness of an entire set of speech acts “brigaded” 
with prohibited conduct: agreements to commit unlawful acts (conspiracy), 
solicitations of unlawful acts, threats, and so on. 
Id. at 828. 
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underlying values of the German constitution, American balancing, even 
in its strict sense, is usually based on a more pragmatic and minimalist 
approach.  American balancing has historical ties to the pragmatic American 
movement of the early twentieth century and to figures such as Holmes, 
Pound, and Cardozo, who viewed law as a means to achieving social 
goals and balancing as the mechanism for implementing this approach.  
Thus, Holmes wrote in his Path of the Law that “judges . . . have failed 
adequately to recognize their duty of weighing considerations of social 
advantage.”150  Cardozo invoked a balancing attitude when he wrote that 
legal decisions depend “largely upon the comparative importance or 
value of the social interest that will be thereby promoted or impaired.”  
And Roscoe Pound wrote in favor of “a weighing of the social interest,” 
arguing that “law is an attempt to satisfy, to reconcile, to harmonize, to 
adjust . . . overlapping and often conflicting claims and demands.”151  To 
this day, self-proclaimed pragmatists such as Posner, associate themselves 
with balancing.152
German proportionality, for its part, must be understood as emerging 
from German formalist jurisprudence.  Originating in nineteenth-century 
German legal science, German legal formalism views law as an 
autonomous and logical science.153  Thus, despite its lofty and abstract 
goals, proportionality is the product of a legal frame of mind that is far 
more formalistic than the American one.  In this context, the contemporary 
German legal scholar Bomhoff has provided a striking description of the 
differences between American balancing and German proportionality.  
Referring to the German Lüth decision, Bomhoff argues: 
Lüth, in this view, becomes the embodiment of the European legal culture’s will 
to believe that a formal, legal conception of the judicial weighing of interests or 
values is possible.  Balancing, in this German or Continental view, does not 
have to be about policy choices, compromises or ad hocery, but can be about 
interpreting constitutional rights within a pyramidal, “objective” system of 
values.  Balancing is not a discretion or an option; it can be a necessity, a 
constitutional obligation.  Balancing may very well not “rigidify” in the way 
American adjudication has according to Schauer, because it already is highly 
 150. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, The Path of the Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 
167, 184 (1920) (emphasis added). 
 151. Roscoe Pound, A Survey of Social Interests, 57 HARV. L. REV. 1, 6, 39 (1943). 
 152. See, for example, Posner’s criticism of the rejection of balancing in First 
Amendment jurisprudence, in Posner, supra note 47. 
 153. Indeed, a tension between radical formalism and an element of idealism and 
values has always existed in German jurisprudence and, in fact, typifies it.  Such 
ambivalence can be found in nineteenth-century German jurisprudence.  German legal 
science of that same period, or Rechtwissenschaft, made extensive use of exact science 
terminology to describe the scientific method by which the legal system operates; 
however, the legal scientist also sought to detect the moral, national, and historic core 
from which legal rules are derived.  On this tension, see Reimann, supra note 87, at 882–
83.
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formal in other ways.  And balancing does not need to be associated with 
ideology in the same way as Duncan Kennedy describes it for the U.S., because, 
put (perhaps too) bluntly: judicial balancing in constitutional cases does not 
have to be politics, it can be law.154
Thus, American balancing, even in its strict sense, can be understood as 
pragmatic and policy-oriented in contrast to the more abstract and 
conceptual German proportionality.  And in this respect, American balancing, 
even in the strict sense, can be seen as bounded, albeit by pragmatic 
concerns and a pragmatic attitude. 
D. The Structural Constitutional Differences Between                           
Germany and America 
The previous two sections showed how their respective political and 
legal cultures have assigned different meanings to German proportionality 
and American proportionality despite their analytical resemblance.  This 
section will show how structural factors pertaining to constitutional 
architecture and the scope of constitutional rights are also responsible for 
the different extents to which the two doctrines are used in their 
respective legal systems.  Indeed, in Germany, the expansive nature of 
constitutional rights creates a structural need for balancing in its intrinsic 
sense; in the United States, in contrast, the narrower scope of constitutional 
rights allows for the bounded type of balancing. 
Rights are considerably broader in definition and scope in Germany 
than they are in America.  This breadth is termed by German scholars as 
the “total application” of the constitution.155  This total application features 
three central characteristics.  First, the wider scope of constitutional 
rights in Germany has resulted from the fact that its constitution speaks 
explicitly of underlying values and does not limit itself to the enumeration 
of rights; this has paved the way to an expansive constitutional approach to 
rights.156  Unlike rights, values are abstract entities in essence that can 
 154. Bomhoff, supra note 102 (footnotes omitted). 
 155. Mattias Kumm, Who’s Afraid of the Total Constitution? Constitutional Rights 
as Principles and the Constitutionalization of Private Law, 7 GERMAN L.J. 341, 341–43 
(2006), http://www.germanlawjournal.com/pdf/Vol07No04/PDF_Vol_07_No_04_341-
370_Articles%20Kumm.pdf.
 156. The German constitution opens with the words: “Human dignity shall be 
inviolable,” and article 20(1) enunciates, “The Federal Republic of Germany is a 
democratic and social federal state.”  GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [Constitution] arts. 1(1), 20(1) 
(F.R.G.), available at http://www.bundestag.de/interakt/infomat/fremdsprachiges_material/ 
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have very broad meaning.  As a result, in Germany, almost any legitimate 
individual or collective interest is tied to a constitutional value and 
accorded constitutional status.157  The concept of rights in Germany is so 
broad that it has enabled the Constitutional Court to consider even such 
trivial interests as riding horses in the woods, feeding pigeons, smoking 
marijuana, and importing a certain breed of dog as constitutional 
rights.158  The American Constitution, in contrast, does not speak in terms 
of values but rather of enumerated rights.  Furthermore, rights are often 
times interpreted more narrowly by delimiting their scope or excluding 
certain activities from that scope.  A prominent example of this is the 
right to free speech, from which certain categories of speech have been 
excluded.
A second feature of this doctrine of total application is that, in contrast 
to the American constitutional conception of constitutional rights as 
solely negative rights,159 the German Constitutional Court has ruled that 
rights also have a protective, or positive, function.  More specifically, 
the court has held that constitutional rights oblige the state to take any 
necessary measures in order to ensure their realization.160  For example, 
in 1972, it interpreted a constitutional provision guaranteeing that “all 
Germans shall have the right freely to choose . . . their place of training”161
as imposing a duty on the state to provide schooling.162  In another case, 
downloads/ggEn_download.pdf (English translation).  See also article 19(2), which provides, 
“In no case may the essence of a basic right be affected.”  Id. art. 19(2). 
 157. Limits can be placed on any constitutional right in order to advance another 
constitutional value that is embedded in the constitution, either explicitly or implicitly, 
and that is ranked higher on the constitutional scale of values. 
 158. Kumm, supra note 4, at 141. 
 159. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195–96 
(1989); Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1203 (7th Cir. 1983) (referring to the 
American Constitution as a “charter of negative rather than positive liberties”), cert. 
denied, 465 U.S. 1049 (1983); Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1982); cf.
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 998 (2d ed. 1988) (noting that in 
the context of free speech, the Court has suggested that the “government may, and 
perhaps must, act positively to reduce [private] repression [of the First Amendment]”). 
 160. Dieter Grimm, The Protective Function of the State, in EUROPEAN AND US
CONSTITUTIONALISM, supra note 21, at 137, 137–38. 
 161. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [Constitution] art. 12 (F.R.G.), available at http://www. 
bundestag.de/interakt/infomat/fremdsprachiges_material/downloads/ggEn_download.pdf 
(English translation). 
162. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] July 18, 
1972, 33 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BverfGE] 303 (F.R.G.), 
available at http://www.servat.unibe.ch/dfr/bv033303.html, stating: 
The constitutional protection of basic rights in the field of education is not 
limited to the protective function against governmental intervention 
traditionally ascribed to the basic rights.  Because the right would be worthless 
without the actual ability to make use of it, the entitlement of every German 
to carry out his chosen study program if he demonstrates the requisite 
qualifications . . . is not in the discretion of the lawmakers. 
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the court interpreted the constitutional provision guaranteeing the right 
to life as placing an active duty on the state to enact criminal legislation 
banning abortion, and it further ruled that the state should also act to 
ensure that the mother’s economic and occupational security are not 
impaired if she decides not to abort.163 In the United States, however, 
the Supreme Court decided that “although government may not place 
obstacles in the path of a woman’s exercise of her freedom of choice to 
terminate her pregnancy, it need not remove those not of its own 
creation.”164  That is to say, the fact that women have the right to free 
choice and the state is therefore prohibited from banning abortions does 
not impose on the state a positive obligation to fund abortions. 
Third, unlike the American reading of the Constitution, the German 
Constitutional Court has ruled that constitutional rights also apply 
indirectly in the context of relations between individuals; namely, the 
interpretation of the rules of private law should be in line with the values 
of the constitution—the Drittwirkung doctrine.165 The American 
Constitution, on the other hand, is not interpreted as granting rights 
protection to individuals in their relations with other individuals, but 
only to individuals vis-à-vis the state.166
Clearly, the broader the scope of constitutional rights, the more often 
they will clash.  Therefore, the more expansive the conception of rights, 
the greater the need for a mechanism such as balancing for resolving 
conflicts among rights.  Because everything counts in constitutional 
Id. at 330 (author’s translation).  For example, the provision that secures a person’s 
freedom to choose his or her specific vocation of study obliges the state to finance the 
studies.  David P. Currie, Positive and Negative Constitutional Rights, 53 U. CHI. L. REV.
864, 871 (1986). 
 163. The second abortion case can be found in Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] 
[Federal Constitutional Court] May 28, 1993, 88 Entscheidungen des Bundesver-
fassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 203 (F.R.G.), available at http://www.servat.unibe.ch/dfr/ 
bv088203.html, discussed in Kommers, supra note 86, at 870. 
 164. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316 (1980) (emphasis added). 
 165. Lüth, Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Jan. 
15, 1958, 7 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BverfGE] 198 (F.R.G.) 
(author’s translation), available at http://www.servat.unibe.ch/dfr/bv007198.html; see 
also Stephen Gardbaum, The “Horizontal Effect” of Constitutional Rights, 102 MICH. L.
REV. 387, 415 (2003) (stressing the impact of constitutions on the rules of private law). 
 166. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 936 (1982).  An exception to this 
rule can be found in Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), in which the Court would 
not enforce a racist restrictive covenant, as court decisions constitute state actions.  Id. at 
4, 20.  For criticism of Shelley, see Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of 
Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 29–31 (1959). 
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adjudication, rights are often conceived in Germany as an “optimization 
requirement.”167  In the United States, the narrower conception of rights 
makes conflict less pervasive.  Moreover, constitutional rights are often 
perceived in America as shorthand for applying exclusionary reasons vis-
à-vis the government, or limiting the scope of legitimate governmental 
ends.168  Whereas conflict is inherent in the German notion of rights 
as an optimization requirement and, hence, balancing is essential, the 
American concept of rights as exclusionary reasons makes conflict less 
likely because protecting rights means striking down illegitimate 
purposes rather than promoting legitimate ones.  Balancing is therefore 
needed in the latter in its bounded sense of smoking out illegitimate 
purposes and not in the intrinsic sense. 
IV. AFTERWORD: THE RAMIFICATIONS OF HELLER FOR THE                  
FOREIGN LAW DEBATE
This Article has attempted to show that, although there are no 
substantial analytical and doctrinal differences between American 
balancing and German proportionality, different meanings are assigned 
to each of these doctrines and they serve different functions in their respective 
legal systems.  In Germany—which is the birthplace of proportionality 
and the most influential model of it—proportionality is a principal 
doctrine that encompasses such intrinsic values as moderation and 
compromise and that acts to integrate society under shared values.  In 
addition, the expansive nature of rights under German constitutionalism 
creates a structural need for intrinsic balancing, making proportionality 
inevitable and central to the German model.  In America, on the other 
 167. ALEXY, supra note 104, at 44, 47–48, 67, 397; HESSE, supra note 98, at 27, 
30–31.
 168. The term “exclusionary reasons” is taken from Josph Raz’s practical reasoning 
philosophy.  See JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS 35 (1999).  It has been 
applied to describe American constitutional law.  See Richard H. Pildes, Avoiding
Balancing: The Role of Exclusionary Reasons in Constitutional Law, 45 HASTINGS L.J.
711, 711–12 (1994); see also Iddo Porat, On the Jehovah’s Witnesses Cases, Balancing 
Tests, and Three Kinds of Multicultural Claims, 1 LAW & ETHICS HUM. RTS. 429, 430, 
440–41 (2007), http://www.bepress.com/lehr/vol1/iss1/art13/ (follow download link to 
access article); Iddo Porat, The Dual Model of Balancing, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1393, 
1417–23 (2006).  Some authors, while not making direct use of the term, have a similar 
conception of rights in American law.  See, e.g., DWORKIN, supra note 130, at 197–201, 
234–36 (arguing rights are constructs designed to exclude those instances in which 
history has shown that the utilitarian tends to be corrupted by external preferences); 
Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the 
Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091, 1142 (1986) (interpreting the 
Commerce Clause as “excluding” protectionist motives); Rubenfeld, supra note 47, at 
768, 779–82, 787, 832 (advocating a nonbalancing approach to free speech law in the 
United States). 
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hand, balancing is more secondary and bounded by a more categorical 
approach towards rights.  It is instrumental in smoking out illicit 
motives, it serves as proxy for a categorical approach, and when true 
balancing does take place, it is subsidiary and applied in a pragmatic 
fashion, quite different from the more idealistic and structured German 
model.  Indeed, the narrower conception of rights in the United States 
gives rise to this subsidiary use of balancing, making it less central in 
American constitutional law. 
In the context of the ongoing foreign law debate in the U.S. Supreme 
Court, it can be argued that Justice Breyer’s move in Heller was not at 
all dramatic.  If all that Justice Breyer did was label the specific type of 
balancing conducted in America with a foreign name, then he did not 
change the nature of that balancing.  By using the term “proportionality” 
per se, he did not mandate the adoption of the German sense of intrinsic 
balancing.  But this is true only to a certain extent: If the experience of 
other legal systems is any indication, the use of common terminology 
and common language may have drawn legal systems closer to one 
another.  In that respect, Justice Breyer’s tactic was not only backward 
looking—in showing similarities between American law and foreign 
law—but it was also forward looking—creating a shared framework for 
dialogue and a mutual exchange of ideas between the United States 
and other democratic societies.  Canada serves as a telling example of 
such a process. 
In Canada, the introduction of proportionality into its constitutional 
law was accompanied by the introduction of continental organic 
conceptions of the state and an intrinsic type of balancing.  While this 
does not establish a causal connection between proportionality and the 
migration of the German and continental constitutional model, it might 
nonetheless be an indication of the ability of proportionality to facilitate 
such a development by creating a common language, which allows for 
easier global migration.  Indeed, although Canadian constitutional law 
has always diverged in many respects from the American system,169 it is 
 169. Although the American Declaration of Independence speaks of “life, liberty 
and the pursuit of happiness” principles that are commonly tied to Lockean libertarian 
ideas, the Canadian Constitution speaks of “peace, order and good government” 
principles that are tied to a more communitarian conception of the polity and that assume 
good faith on the part of the government rather than being wary of it.  See RAND DYCK,
CANADIAN POLITICS: CRITICAL APPROACHES (3d ed. 2000).  Of note also is the following 
statement made by Alberta’s former premier on the reasons why Canada should not 
adopt a constitutional bill of rights: “Canada has always operated under the 
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a common law system and is more closely tied to the Anglo-American 
legal tradition than to the continental one.170  However, in several 
Supreme Court decisions over the last two decades, there is very clear 
evidence of a European type of reasoning and of what has been termed 
in this Article as intrinsic balancing; such analyses were not previously 
present in the Court’s jurisprudence.171
This analytical evolution has been noted by commentators who argue 
that continental constitutional ideas—in particular, the language of 
underlying values and the broad conception of rights—have been imported 
into Canada.172  As previously mentioned, this coincided with the 
adoption of proportionality and its evolution into the central doctrine in 
Canadian Charter jurisprudence.173  Indeed, in 1986, four years after the 
adoption of the Canadian Charter, the Canadian Supreme Court recognized 
the European doctrine of proportionality by interpreting Section 1 of the 
Charter as including it.174  In the years to come, proportionality analysis 
principles of responsible government and the sovereignty of the people as expressed 
through their legislators who are accountable to the people.”  Janet Hiebert, The
Evolution of the Limitation Clause, 28 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 103, 110 (1990) (emphasis 
added).  Some commentators speak specifically in terms of the symbiotic ties between 
the judiciary and the state in Canada.  See Jamie Cameron, The Original Conception of 
Section 1 and Its Demise: A Comment on Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Attorney-General of Quebec, 
35 MCGILL L.J. 253, 262 (1989); Ruth Colker, Section 1, Contextuality, and the Anti-
Disadvantage Principle, 42 U. TORONTO L.J. 77, 84–85, 100–05 (1992); Robin M. Elliot, 
The Supreme Court of Canada and Section 1: The Erosion of the Common Front, 12 
QUEEN’S L.J. 277, 277–81 (1987); Frank Iacobucci, The Evolution of Constitutional 
Rights and Corresponding Duties: The Leon Ladner Lecture, U. B.C. L. REV. 1, 16–17 
(1992).
 170. For an account of the liberal Dworkinian ideas on the 1982 Canadian Charter 
of Rights and Freedoms, see PETER W. HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA § 38.1–.3 
(5th ed. 2007); see also DAVID BEATTY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 
63, 108–09, 127 (1995); Lorraine Eisenstat Weinrib, The Supreme Court of Canada and 
Section One of the Charter, 10 SUP. CT. L. REV. 469, 512 (1988). 
171. See Reference re Secession of Que., [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 (Can.); R. v. Butler, 
[1992] 1 S.C.R. 452 (Can.) (pornography); R.v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697 (Can.) 
(hate speech). 
172. See sources cited infra notes 182, 186. 
 173. Proportionality law entered Canada in 1986.  See R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 
103 (Can.).  The judgments with the “organic” style of reasoning are all from the 1990s.  
See cases cited supra note 171. 
 174. Section 1 of the Canadian Charter, which is often referred to as the “Limitation 
Clause,” set the terms for the justifiable restriction of rights: “The Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such 
reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and 
democratic society.”  Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the 
Canada Act 1982, ch. 11 (U.K.).  This clause was interpreted in Oakes, 1 S.C.R. 103, to 
include the following proportionality test, which is very similar to the German test: 
First, the measures adopted must be carefully designed to achieve the objective 
in question.  They must not be arbitrary, unfair or based on irrational 
considerations.  In short, they must be rationally connected to the objective.  
Second, the means, even if rationally connected to the objective in this first 
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became almost synonymous with constitutional analysis in Canada, 
becoming the most important doctrine in Canadian constitutional law.175
At the same time, several Canadian Supreme Court decisions using 
proportionality showed a clear continental influence.  In the Keegstra
case,176 for example, which dealt with hate speech, the court—
following what seems to be classic “organic” legal reasoning—ruled 
that the limitation clause has a dual function that links the guarantee of 
rights and freedoms to their limitations.177  Both rights and their 
limitations stem from the same set of values, which is embedded in the 
phrase “free and democratic society.”178  The role of the court is, hence, 
to weigh competing legitimate interests and to find the appropriate 
balance that best realizes these underlying values.  In particular, the 
court considers which of the values are most closely connected to the 
paramount value of Canadian multiculturalism, similar to the human 
dignity prism in German constitutional law.  The Canadian court stated 
that “Canada possesses a multicultural society in which the diversity and 
richness of various cultural groups is a value to be protected and enhanced”; 
furthermore, it held that “[m]ulticulturalism cannot be preserved let alone 
enhanced if free rein is given to the promotion of hatred against identifiable 
cultural groups.”179  It is important to note that the dissenting opinion 
criticized the majority for watering down the distinction between rights and 
interests, arguing that the court was depicting a conflict “between 
philosophies” and “not between rights.”180
A second case that manifested even more clearly the migration of 
constitutional organic ideas is the Quebec Secession case, which dealt 
with the terms by which Quebec can secede from the Canadian 
sense, should impair “as little as possible” the right or freedom in question.  
Third, there must be a proportionality between the effects of the measures 
which are responsible for limiting the Charter right or freedom, and the 
objective which has been identified as of “sufficient importance.” 
Id. at 139 (citation omitted). 
175. See generally Sujit Choudhry, So What Is the Real Legacy of Oakes? Two 
Decades of Proportionality Analysis Under the Canadian Charter’s Section 1, 34 SUP.
CT. L. REV. 501, 505–21 (2006) (explaining the dominant role of proportionality analysis 
in Canadian constitutional law). 
176. Keegstra, 3 S.C.R. at 735–36. 
177. Id.
 178. Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, 
ch. 11 (U.K.). 
179. Keegstra, 3 S.C.R. at 757, 758. 
180. Id. at 833 (McLachlin, J., dissenting). 
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Federation.181  In this decision, the court used particularly expansive 
language that echoed the underlying values rhetoric typical of the German 
and continental organic conception of the state.182  The constitution, 
declared the Canadian court, “is more than a written text.  It embraces 
the entire global system of rules and principles which govern the exercise of 
constitutional authority.”183  Balancing between these principles ensures 
that “[n]o single principle can be defined in isolation from the others, 
nor does any one principle trump or exclude the operation of any 
other.”184  Judicial reasoning is therefore not about exclusionary reasons; 
it is instead about moderation and compromise between competing and 
valid principles.  In this case in particular, the outcome of the balancing 
analysis was tied to the values of moderation and compromise associated 
with intrinsic balancing.  The court imposed a positive duty on both 
sides to negotiate in good faith the terms of secession.185  The case also 
served to promote dialogue in which the court and elected bodies bear 
joint constitutional responsibility.186
The Canadian example is a far cry from conclusive proof that the 
introduction of proportionality language into U.S. jurisprudence would 
result in a similar subsequent adoption of the European organic conception 
of the state.  Compared to the United States, Canada may have been 
much more receptive to continental ideas from the outset.  However, the 
Canadian case does seem to offer some evidence that proportionality 
facilitates the infiltration of continental constitutional ideas into a common 
law judicial system.  At the very least, the appearance of proportionality 
seems to coincide with the adoption of a continental organic-based 
approach.
In conclusion, although this Article tried to show that American 
balancing is a distinct phenomenon from European proportionality in 
181. See Reference re Secession of Que., [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 (Can.) (presenting a 
full evaluation of the procedures for Quebec to secede from Canada). 
 182. Jean-François Gaudreault-Desbiens, Underlying Principles and the Migration 
of Reasoning Templates: A Trans-Systemic Reading of Quebec Secession Reference, in
THE MIGRATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL IDEAS, supra note 25, at 178, 189–207. 
183. Reference re Secession of Que., 2 S.C.R. at 292.
184. Id. at 248. 
 185. The Court ruled that “[n]o negotiations could be effective if their ultimate 
outcome, secession, is cast as an absolute legal entitlement based upon an obligation to 
give effect to that act of secession in the Constitution.  Such a foregone conclusion 
would actually undermine the obligation to negotiate and render it hollow.”  Id. at 267. 
 186. See Sujit Choudhry & Robert Howse, Constitutional Theory and the Quebec 
Secession Reference, 13 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 143, 160 (2000), who argue that the 
Canadian Court has in fact adopted a model of “joint constitutional responsibility.”  Id.
Under this theory, in extraordinary cases in which the court lacks the institutional 
competency or legitimacy to translate abstract constitutional ideals into judicially 
enforceable standards, “it is for the political organs of the Constitution to frame their 
own interpretation of those norms and to assess their own compliance with them.”  Id.
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terms of meaning and function, this may change over time.  The use of 
the term proportionality may help to open the door for European influences 
on American constitutional law.  Arguably, such a move should have 
been done more openly by making the reference to foreign law explicit 
rather than implicit. 
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